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ATTORNEY SOLICITATION: THE SCOPE OF STATE 
REGULATION AFTER PRIMUS AND OHRALIK 
Within the past few years, there has been a growing concern-
both within and without the legal profession-over increasing the 
layman's access to legal services. Two of the principal means of 
increasing this access, advertising and solicitation, 1 have long been 
prohibited by the organized bar, although a few minor exceptions 
have been allowed. In lff77, the question of the constitutionality of 
prohibitions against legal advertising was presented to the United 
States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 2 The Court 
ruled in a landmark decision that certain types of advertising could 
not be prohibited, but expressly reserved the question of the con-
stitutionality of prohibitions against in-person solicitation.3 Eleven 
months after Bates, the Court decided two attorney solicitation 
cases, In re Primus 4 and Ohra/ik v. Ohio State Bar Association. 5 
Those who had expected groundbreaking rulings of the degree of 
Bates were no doubt disappointed, for Primus and Ohra/ik appear 
to have produced little change in the laws governing attorney solic-
itation. Indeed, it may be said that those decisions have introduced 
an added degree of confusion in the area of solicitation. 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the opinions in Primus 
and Ohralik, to delineate the scope of permissible state regulation 
in the wake of those two decisions, and to recommend specific 
changes in existing state solicitation rules. Part I examines the gen-
eral nature of attorney solicitation law - by whom it is made and 
how it is enforced. Part II describes the statutory and constitu-
tional aspects of solicitation law prior to Primus and Ohralik. Part 
III discusses the Court's holdings in Primus and Ohralik, and the 
changes in current statutory schemes required by the two deci-
sions. Part IV considers whether the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction drawn by the court in Primus and Ohralik furnishes a 
useful or desirable basis for state regulation of attorney solicita-
' There is often only a very fine line between advertisement and solicitation. Generally 
speaking, "advertising" refers to "activities which seek to inform, notify or persuade the 
public, but without the use of a person-person encounter," while "solicitation" refers to 
"similar activities involving personal contact." Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Pro-
fession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. ll81, ll81 n.4 (1972). So-
called "ambulance chasing" is a type of solicitation that involves the employment of laymen 
to procure personal injury cases for an attorney. These laymen are sometimes called "run-
ners" or "cappers" and provide this service for a fee. The term is sometimes used to de-
scribe the practices of attorneys who employ such laymen, or to the personal solicitation of 
accident cases by the attorney himself. 
2 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
3 /d. at 366. 
• 436 U.S. 412 (1978). For a discussion of the facts, see note 34 infra. 
• 436 U.S. 447 (1978). For discussion of the facts, see note 48 infra. 
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tion. Finally, Part V provides a brief treatment of the arguments for 
and against liberalized attorney solicitation rules, and contains 
specific proposals for liberalization of current state solicitation 
rules. The article concludes that the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction should not be used as a basis for state solicitation laws, 
that all attorneys should have the same freedom to solicit, and that 
both attorneys and laymen would benefit from carefully drawn lib-
eral rules designed to prevent the legitimate dangers of attorney so-
licitation. 
I. THE NATURE OF ATTORNEY SOLICITATION LAWS 
A. By Whom It Is Made 
Attorney solicitation falls within the category of attorneys' "pro-
fessional conduct" or" professional ethics" and, as such, is sub-
ject to regulation by the judiciary. The responsibility of the courts 
to regulate the admission of attorneys to the bar and to define and 
regulate the practice of law is based on the inherent power of the 
courts to regulate the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court. 6 
Generally, the highest court of a particular jurisdiction prescribes 
the rules relating to conduct of attorneys in that jurisdiction. 7 In 
jurisdictions with a mandatory or "integrated;' bar,8 the rules may 
be prescribed by the governing body of the bar, subject to approval 
by the highest court of the state. Rules relating to attorney conduct 
are thus part of t_he "rules of court" in each state.9 
B. How It Is Enforced 
The disciplinary process is administered either by a disciplin~i-y 
agency as an adjunct to the court, or by grievance committees of 
bar associations as representatives of the court. The rules and pro-
cedures under which the disciplinary system is administered are 
6 See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY 
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 
SECTION II (The Inherent Power of the Court to Supervise the Disciplinary Process) (1970), 
and cases discussed therein. · 
7 In the state of New York, for example, each of the four Judicial Departments issues rules 
regulating attorney conduct; at present, all four Departments have approved the same set of 
rules. In the District of Columbia, the rules are prescribed by the D.C. Court of Appeals. 
8 One state having an integrated bar is Arizona. For the statutory framework of the State 
Bar of Arizona, see Rule 27 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona, reprinted in 
ARIZONA RULES OF COURT 492-500 (West 1978) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-201, -237, -264 
(West 1976). 
• In this article, the term "state regulation" is used to refer to regulation by that body 
which is responsible for promulgation of rules of attorney conduct, be it the highest court, 
the state bar, or the legislature acting in aid of the courts. 
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prescribed by the body that is responsible for promulgation of the 
rules of attorney conduct. 
Disciplinary investigations usually begin with a complaint by an 
aggrieved client, another attorney, or a bar association. In addi-
tion, a court, on its own initiative, may institute disciplinary pro-
ceedings when it appears that the attorney is unworthy to continue 
as an officer of the court. The complaint is usually investigated by a 
lawyer who is a member of a disciplinary committee, a professional 
investigator, or a staff lawyer. Upon completion of the investiga-
tion, the investigator reports to an inquiry panel of the disciplinary 
agency or bar association. 
The inquiry panel reviews the report to determine if formal ac-
tion should be brought. The complaint may be dismissed, an infor-
mal reprimand given, or formal charges filed. If charges are filed, 
the matter is set for trial or hearing. The body before which disci-
plinary proceedings are heard varies from state to state; they may 
be conducted before a referee, a court commissioner, or, in two or 
three states, before a jury. I 0 
After the trial or hearing, a recommendation is made to the disci-
plinary board or to the state's highest court. Either body may 
suggest dismissal of the complaint or discipline. If the recom-
mendation is to the disciplin•ary board, that board makes a final 
recommendation to the state's highest court which has ultimate au-
thority. Discipline may consist of a private or public reprimand, 
suspension, or disbarment. I I 
JI. THE STATE OF ATTORNEY SOLICITATION 
LA ws PRIOR TO Primus AND Ohra/ik 
A. The State Rules 
State rules of attorney conduct are usually patterned after the 
provisions of the American Bar Association Code of Professional 
Responsibility (ABA Code), which functions as a model code of 
ethics for the legal profession. The current ABA Code, adopted in 
August, 1977, deals specifically with attorney soltcitation in Disci-
,o Bradner, The Lawyer Disciplinary Process, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION DISCI-
PLINARY LAW AND PROCEDURE INDEX 4 (1978). 
11 For a more in-depth discussion of the topics examined in the subsection, see generally 
Bradner, supra note 10. For a discussion of a discipline in advertisement and solicitation 
cases, see generally Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REV. 677, 
690-94 (1954). 
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plinary Rules 2-103(Recommendation of Professional Employ-
ment)12 and 2-104 (Suggestion of Need of Legal Services). 13 Gen-
12 DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Employment, reads as follows: 
(A) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-lOl(B) [the advertising pro-
vision], recommend employment as a private practitioner of himself, his partner, or 
associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a 
lawyer. 
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organi-
zation to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a reward for hav-
ing made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client, except that he 
may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by any of the organizations 
listed in DR 2-103(0). 
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend or promote 
the use of his services or those of his partner or associate, or any other lawyer af-
filiated with him or his firm, as a private practitioner, except as authorized in DR 
2-101, and except that 
(l) He may request referrals from a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or 
approved by a bar association and may pay its fees incident thereto. 
(2) He may cooperate with the legal service activities of any of the offices DR 
2-103(0)(1) through (4) and may perform legal services for those to whom he was 
recommended by it to do such work if: 
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a member or benefic-
iary of such office or organization; and 
(b) The lawyer remains free to exercise his independent professional judgment 
on behalf of his client. 
(D) A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or 
his firm may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may cooperate with, one of 
the following offices or organizations that promote the use of his services or those 
of his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if there 
is no interference with the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf 
of his client: 
(l) A legal aid office or public defender office: 
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school. 
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community organization. 
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency. 
(d) Operated, sponsored or approved by a bar association. 
(2) A military assistant office. 
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar associa-
tion. 
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal ser-
vices to its members or beneficiaries provided the following conditions are satis-
fied: 
· (a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and operated that 
no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal services by lawyers, and 
that, if the organization is operated for profit, the legal services are not rendered 
by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or selected by it except in connec-
tion with matters where such organization bears ultimate liability of its member 
or beneficiary. 
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any other lawyer af-
filiated with him or his firm, nor any non-lawyer, shall have initiated or pro-
moted such organization for the primary purpose of providing financial or other 
benefit to such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer. 
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring legal work or 
financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner outside of the legal ser-
vices program of the organization. 
(d) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are furnished, and not 
such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter. 
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services furnished 
or paid for by the organization may, if such member or beneficiary so desires, 
select counsel other than that furnished, selected or approved by the organiza-
tion for the particular matter involved; and the legal service plan of such organi-
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erally, attorney solicitation is prohibited except for the specific in-
stances described in those rules. Some states have adopted the 
ABA Code verbatim, while others have adopted provisions with 
minor deviations. 14 In addition to providing disciplinary proceed-
ings, some states impose criminal liability for certain forms of at-
torney solicitation, although such liability is imposed by statute 
rather than by court rules. 15 The exact provisions of the various 
state solicitation rules are not important here; it need only be noted 
that as of the time of the decisions in Primus and Ohra/ik, no juris-
zation provides appropriate relief for any member or beneficiary who asserts a 
claim that representation by counsel furnished, selected or approved would be 
unethical, improper or inadequate under the circumstances of the matter in-
volved and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief. 
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such organization is in 
violation of applicable laws, rules of court and other legal requirements that 
govern its legal service operations. 
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary authority at 
least annually a report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing in 
terms, its schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with coun-
sel, and financial results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so, 
the lawyer does not know or have cause to know of such failure. 
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious that the 
person who seeks his services does so as a result of conduct prohibited under this 
Disciplinary Rule. 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY {1977)(footnotes 
omitted). 
13 DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services, reads as follows: 
(A) A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he 
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting 
from that advice, except that: 
(I) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client (if 
the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer rea-
sonably believes to be a client. 
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation in activities 
designed to educate laypersons to recognize legal problems, to make intelligent 
selection of counsel or to utilize available legal services if such activities are con-
ducted or sponsored by a qualified legal assistance organization. 
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by a qualified legal assistance 
organization enumerated in DR 2-IOO(D)(I) through (4) may represent a member or 
beneficiary thereof, to the extent and under the conditions prescribed therein. 
(4) Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer may speak publicly 
or write for publication on legal topics so long as he does not emphasize his own 
professional experience or reputation and does not undertake to give individual ad-
vice. 
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of 
a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but 
shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their 
joinder. 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1977)(footnotes 
omitted). 
14 See, e.g., Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, reprinted in 
CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT 647-70 (West 1978). 
15 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§§ 6150-6154 (West 1974 & Supp. 3B 1977). Section 
6153 makes certain types of attorney solicitation punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 
6 months or by a fine not exceeding $2,500, or both. 
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diction allowed solicitation by private lawyers for personal gain. 16 
B. Constitutional Aspects of Attorney 
Solicitation Law: The Right of Groups 
to Solicit 
In a series of cases beginning in 1963, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that certain types of attorney solicitation are pro-
tected by the first amendment. Specifically, solicitation by groups 
is permissible if the claim solicited is related to the activity which 
forms the basis for group membership. 
In NAACP v. Button, 17 for example, the petitioner organization 
had brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a Virginia state law 
which prohibited attorney solicitation. In the lower courts, certain 
activities of the NAACP had been held to be illegal under state sta-
tutes. These activities included the maintenance of a legal staff of 
fifteen attorneys, all of whom were NAACP members, and who 
were paid a per diem fee (not to exceed $60, plus out-of-pocket ex-
penses) to conduct civil rights litigation. 18 The case arose out of 
the efforts of the NAACP to recruit plaintiffs for school desegrega-
tion cases. The Court held that such solicitation was protected by 
the first and fourteenth amendments, stating that, for the NAACP, 
''litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a 
means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment 
by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the 
Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political ex-
pression." 19 In addition to this concern over freedom of expres-
sion, the Court stressed its concern over freedom of association, 
observing that the first and fourteenth amendments protect certain 
forms of orderly group activity and that the Constitution protects 
the right "to engage in association for the advancement of belief 
and ideals. " 20 The Court further held that the state's interest in 
regulating professional conduct was insufficiently compelling to 
justify prohibition of solicitation in that case.21 The absence of any 
16 Shortly after Primus and Ohralik were decided, the District of Columbia liberalized its 
solicitation provisions. See Part V D infra. 
11 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
18 The NAACP had called a series of meetings to which all members of the community 
were invited, and at which the staff attorneys urged those present to authorize the attorneys 
to sue on their behalf. The NAACP maintained the ensuing litigation by defraying all ex-
penses. The litigation was under the control of the attorney, rather than the NAACP, and the 
client was free to withdraw from the action at any time. Id. 
19 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429. 
•
0 Id. at 430 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958)). 
21 
"(A] state may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore con-
stitutional rights." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 439. 
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motive of pecuniary gain on the part of the NAACP lawyers, and 
the nature of the litigation being solicited, clearly influenced the 
Court's decision. 22 
In 1964, the Court further expanded the right of groups to solicit 
in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia 
State Bar. 23 In that case, the Virginia State Bar had brought suit to 
enjoin the union from referring members' tort claims to a group of 
private attorneys, an activity characterized by the Bar as unlawful 
solicitation. 24 The Virginia court granted an injunction against the 
union, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
such activities were "an inseparable part of this constitutionally 
guaranteed right [of the workers] to assist and advise each 
other.' ' 25 Thus the right of groups to solicit was not held to be lim-
ited to "political expression" cases. As in Button, the Court 
stressed the associational rights of the union members; it also 
noted that a state could not infringe on a person's right to be fairly 
represented in congressionally-authorized suits by invoking the 
power to regulate professional conduct.26 
An attempt to limit the holding in Button to litigation involving 
political expression again failed in United Mine Workers v. Illinois 
State Bar Association. 27 In tqat case, the bar association had suc-
ceeded in enjoining the UMW from employing a licensed attorney 
on a salary basis to represent any of its members who wished his 
services to prosecute workmen's compensation claims before the 
Illinois Industrial Commission. The lower court had limited Button 
to cases involving political expression, and limited Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen to the recommendation of attorneys not hired 
by a group on a salary basis. The United States Supreme Court va-
cated the injunctions, finding that the freedoms of speech, assem-
bly, and petition gave the union the right to engage in the activities 
in question. 28 In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected the argu-
ment that the freedom of groups to solicit should be limited to polit-
22 The Court seemed to think that the state statutes were specifically aimed at hampering 
NAACP activities and recognized them as part of Virginia's resistance to integration. Id. at 
433-37. 
23 377 U.S. l (1964). 
2
• Specifically, the union had established a sixteen-lawyer Department of Legal Counsel 
to aid the families of union members who had been killed or injured in railroad accidents in 
obtaining whatever benefits to which they were entitled. The Department recommended to 
union members and their families the names of lawyers whom the union believed were hon-
est and competent. This plan resulted in the channelling of practically all claims, on a private 
fee basis, to attorneys who had been chosen by the union. Id. 
25 377 U.S. at 6. 
26 Id. at 7. 
27 389 u .s. 217 (1967). 
28 Id. at 221-22. 
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ical expression cases.29 Similarly, the Court found no meaningful 
distinction between the financial arrangement in Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen and that in United Mine Workers, and laid 
strong emphasis on the UMW's associational rights. 
Finally, in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michi-
gan ,30 a state bar association had sued to enjoin defendant union 
from paying investigators to keep track of work-related accidents, 
visit injured members, and urge the members to retain named pri-
vate attorneys who were selected by the union and who had agreed 
to charge a contingent fee of not more than 25% of recovery. The 
stated purpose of the plan was to assist injured workers and their 
families in obtaining competent counsel and to protect them from 
excessive fees in suits under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. 
In vacating the injunction, the Court held that collective action to 
obtain access to the courts is a constitutionally-guaranteed funda-
mental right. 31 Significantly, the lawyers involved in the UTU's 
plan were private practitioners and received more than a nominal 
fee; moreover, the union investigators were paid by the union to 
engage in a typical form of "ambulance chasing." Those factors 
notwithstanding, the union's practice was upheld on the strength of 
the Court's prior decisions in Button, Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen, and United Mine Workers. 
The cases discussed above establish two important propositions. 
First, groups are free to solicit political expression cases in certain 
types of circumstances, even if the solicited person is not a group 
member. Second, groups may solicit group members or benefic-
iaries in ordinary commercial litigation if the claim solicited is re-
lated to the activity which forms the basis for group membership. 
The exceptions in DR 2-103(D) are based on the constitutional de-
cisions described here. 32 
III. THE COMMERCIAL/NONCOMMERCIAL DISTINCTION: THE 
COURT'S RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO ATTORNEY SOLICITATION 
Primus and Ohralik were particularly poor cases for adjudicating 
the scope of permissible state regulation of attorney solicitation 
because, as Justice Marshall said, "[t]hey could hardly have arisen 
· 
29 
"[T)he First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can 
be characterized as political. 'Great secular causes with small ones, are guarded .... "' Id. 
at 223 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)). 
30 401 U.S. 576 (1971). 
31 Id. at 585. 
32 AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, CooE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-!03(0) n.78 
(1977). See note 12 supra. 
152 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
in more disparate factual settings. " 33 These cases are polar oppo-
sites and it is probable that most solicitation cases will fall some-
where on the broad continuum between them. Nevertheless, the 
cases must be examined for their impact on the current regulatory 
scheme. 
A. Primus and Ohralik 
On October 9, 1974, the Secretary of the Board of Commission-
ers on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina filed a formal complaint with the Board, charging Edna 
Primus, an attorney practicing in Columbia, South Carolina, with 
having engaged in unlawful solicitation by sending a letter to a wel-
fare mother seeking to have the ACLU represent her in a suit alleg-
ing involuntary sterilization.34 The Board found that Primus was 
guilty of soliciting a client on behalf of the ACLU, in violation of 
Disciplinary Rules 2-103(D)(5)(a) and (c) and 2-104(A)(5) of the 
South Carolina Supreme Court.35 As a result, it administered a pri-
33 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,469 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
34 During the period in question, Primus was associated with a law firm and was an officer 
of and cooperating lawyer with the Columbia branch of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU). Although she received no compensation for her ACLU work, she was paid a re-
tainer as a legal consultant for the South Carolina Council on Human Relations (Council), a 
non-profit organization. 
During the summer of 1973, the Council was asked by Gary Allen, a local businessman and 
officer of a local organization serving indigents, to send one of its, representatives to brief 
three welfare mothers on their legal rights after they had been sterilized, allegedly as a condi-
tion of their being able to continue receiving Medicaid payments. At the Council's request, 
Primus conducted a meeting in Allen's office and advised the women of their legal rights and 
suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. A month later, in August, 1973, the ACLU informed 
Primus that it was willing to provide representation for the women. After Allen told her that 
one of the women, Mary Etta Williams, wished to file suit against the doctor who had per-
formed the sterilizations, Primus wrote Williams, stating: 
The American Civil Liberties Union would like to file a lawsuit on your behalf for 
money against the doctor who performed the operation. We will be coming to Aiken 
in the near future and would like to explain what is involved so you can understand 
what is going on .... 
About the lawsuit, if you are still interested, let me know and I'll let you know 
when we will come down to talk to you about .it. 
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 416 n.6. 
Shortly after receiving the letter, Williams visited her doctor to inquire about one of her 
children and there encountered the doctor's lawyer. At the lawyer's request she signed a 
release of the doctor's liability. After giving the doctor and his lawyer a copy of Primus' 
letter, she called Primus and told her she had decided not to sue. That was the end of all 
communication between the two women. Other attorneys, including two of Primus' as-
sociates who were also ACLU cooperating attorneys, did represent other sterilized mothers 
in a suit against the doctor filed on April 15, 1974. 
35 The code of legal ethics adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court is the original 
1969 version of the ABA Code. South Carolina adopted that version in 1973 and it was in 
force in South Carolina at the time of Primus even though the ABA Code was subsequently 
modified. South Carolina's DR 2-103(0) reads: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recommends, fur-
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vate reprimand. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that Primus had vio-
lated the rules, but increased the discipline to a public reprimand. 
The Court, adopting the Board's findings in full, held that Primus 
had violated DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) because "one of, if not the primary 
purpose of the ACLU, was the rendition of legal services. " 36 It 
also found that she had violated DR 2-103(D)(5)(c) because "[i]t is, 
also, the policy of the ACLU to ask for attorneys' fees in their law-
suits, and their fees go into their central fund and are used, among 
other things, to pay costs and salaries and expenses of staff attor-
neys. "37 Finally, it held that she had violated DR 2-104(A)(5) be-
cause she had asked Williams in the letter to join in a class action 
suit against the doctor.38 
nishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use of his services or those of his 
partners or associates. However, he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the 
legal service activities of any of the following, provided that his independent pro-
fessional judgment is exercised in behalf of his client without interference or con-
trol by any organization or other person: 
()) A legal aid office or public defender office: 
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school. 
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide non-profit community organization. 
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency. 
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association representative of the 
general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists. 
(2) A military legal assistance office. 
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association 
representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association 
exists. 
(4) A bar association representative of the general bar of the geographical area in 
which the association exists. 
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal 
services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in those instances and to the ex-
tent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the 
services requires the allowance of such legal service activities, and only if the fol-
lowing conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met: 
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the rendition of 
legal services. 
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to its members is 
incidental and reasonably related to the primary purposes of such organization. 
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of 
legal services by the lawyer. 
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are rendered, and 
not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in that matter. 
South Carolina's DR 2-104 reads in pertinent part: "(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited 
advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept em-
ployment resulting from that advice, except that: .... " The remainder is essentially the 
same as the corresponding rule in the current ABA Code. These provisions were adopted as 
part of Rule 32 of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 22 S.C. CODE, Rules of the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina, rule 32 (1977)(incorporating by reference the 1969 version of the 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY). 
For the text of the current versions of DR 2-103(0) and DR 2-104, as promulgated by the 
American Bar Association, see notes 12-13 supra. 
38 In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 'Zf,7, 233 S.E.2d 301, 305 (Im) (per curiarn). 
37 Id. at 'Zf,7, 233 S.E.2d at 305. 
38 Id. at 266, 233 S.E.2d at 304. 
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed,39 holding 
that Primus could not constitutionally be disciplined for those ac-
tivities. In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court reiterated its 
holdings in its prior attorney solicitation cases40 and dismissed as 
meaningless the slight distinction between Button and Primus. In 
response to the argument that the ACLU, unlike the NAACP in 
Button, is an organization primarily devoted to the rendition of 
legal services, the Court stated that "for the ACLU, as for the 
NAACP, 'litigation is not a technique of resolving private differ-
ences'; it is 'a form of political expression' and 'association' ."41 
The Court also found unpersuasive the argument that the 
ACLU, unlike the NAACP, benefitted from the litigation solicited. 
Allegedly, the ACLU would have benefitted financially from bring-
ing suit because it commonly requested an award of counsel fees, 
but the Court found that such a request did not remove the solicita-
tion from the category of protected solicitation. It reached this 
conclusion not only because of the fact that counsel fees are not 
drawn from plaintiffs recovery and often do not compare with the 
usual fees obtainable in private litigation, but more importantly, 
because the ACLU is motivated by "its widely recognized goal of 
vindicating civil liberties" _rather than by "considerations of 
pecuniary gain. " 42 The Court reiterated its holding in Button, stat-
ing that where political expression or association is at issue, gov-
ernments must regulate more precisely than they do in the area of 
commercial affairs. 43 The Court suggested that where an attorney 
has engaged in ''in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under cir-
cumstances likely to result in adverse consequences" a showing of 
potential danger is sufficient for discipline;44 but in cases such as 
Primus, the attorney may not be disciplined unless the solicitation 
is in fact "misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of 
deception or improper influence.' '45 The Court found that no such 
misconduct had actually occurred in Primus. Furthermore, be-
cause the solicitation was effected through a letter, it "involved no 
appreciable invasion of privacy; nor did it afford any significant 
opportunity for overreaching or coercion. " 46 
39 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
40 See Part II B supra. 
41 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429, 431). 
42 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 429-30. See also note 72 infra. 
43 Id. at 434 . 
.. Id. 
•• Id. at 438. See note 79 infra. 
46 Id. at 435 (footnote omitted). Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that he disagreed with 
the distinction the Court drew in solicitation cases: "I believe that constitutional inquiry 
must focus on the character of the conduct which the State seeks to regulate, and not on the 
motives of the individual lawyers or the nature of the particular litigation involved." Id. at 
443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He would have affirmed the decision of the state court, be-
lieving that South Carolina had acted within constitutional limits. Id. at 446. 
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The companion case to Primus, Ohra/ik v. Ohio State Bar As-
sociation, 41 presented a far different situation to the Court. In 
Ohra/ik, two accident victims were repeatedly contacted by 
Ohralik, who urged them to hire him as their attorney. Both filed 
complaints against Ohralik with the Grievance Committee of the 
Geauga County, Ohio, Bar Association charging unlawful solicita-
tion. 48 The Association filed a formal complaint with the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Ohio Supreme 
Court. After a hearing, the Board found that Ohralik had violated 
Disciplinary Rules 2-103(A) and 2-104(A) of the Ohio Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility49 and recommended a public reprimand. 
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Board's findings but in-
creased the discipline to indefinite suspension from the practice of 
law.50 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, per Justice Powell, 
affirmed that decision. In-person solicitation by attorneys, it held, 
is different from mere advertising because, unlike advertising, in-
person solicitation "may exert pressure and often demands an im-
mediate response, without providing an opportunity for compari-
son or reflection. " 51 The Court thus rejected Ohralik's argument 
47 436 u .s. 447 (1978). 
48 Ohralik, an attorney practicing in Montville and Cleveland, Ohio, learned in February, 
1974, about an automobile accident that had occurred earlier that month. The driver, Carol 
McClintock, and one of her passengers, Wanda Lou Holbert, were both injured. Ohralik 
called McClintock's parents who told him that their daughter was in the hospital; upon visit-
ing her parents at their home, Ohralik was informed that McClintock's car had been hit by an 
uninsured motorist. 
Upon visiting McClintock in the hospital, Ohralik found her lying in traction. He told her 
he would represent her and asked her to sign an agreement; she declined, stating that she 
wished to discuss the matter with her parents. He also attempted to see Holbert but learned 
that she had just been released from the hospital. 
Ohralik paid another call on McClintock's parents, bringing along a tape recorder which 
he concealed under his coat. Upon examining their insurance policy he told them that both 
women could collect damages under the policy's uninsured motorist clause. The McClin-
tocks told Ohralik that their daughter had phoned to say that he could represent her and they 
also told him that Holbert "swore up and down that she would not [sue for her injuries]." 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 450. 
Ohralik visited Holbert, without having been invited, and again concealed the tape re-
corder with which he recorded most of the conversation with her. He informed her that he 
was representing McClintock and after Holbert stated that "she really did not understand 
what was going on," 436 U.S. at 451, Ohralik also offered to represent her, to which she 
assented. 
Holbert's mother attempted to repudiate her daughter's oral agreement, but Ohralik in-
sisted it was binding. A month later, Holbert confirmed in writing her desire not to sue; she 
told him that the insurance company would not pay her unless he notified the company that 
he was not her lawyer. McClintock also eventually discharged him as her lawyer. Another 
lawyer eventually represented McClintock in concluding a settlement with the insurance 
company, but she paid Ohralik one-third of her recovery in settlement of his lawsuit against 
her for breach of contract. Ohralik also filed suit against Holbert but it was dismissed with 
prejudice after he was disciplined for improper solicitation by the Ohio Supreme Court. 436 
U.S. at 449-52. . 
49 These rules are essentially the same as those in the current ABA Code. See notes 12-13 
supra. 
•
0 Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 220, 357 N .E.2d 1()1)7, 1()()9 (1976). 
•
1 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 457: 
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that his solicitation of the two women was indistinguishable, for 
constitutional purposes, from the advertisement in Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona. 52 The Court also stated that commercial speech is 
afforded only limited protection, corresponding to its "subordi-
nate" position in the first amendment's hierarchy of values. In 
drawing this distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech, the Court argued that the states have a compelling interest 
"in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, 
undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 
'vexatious conduct," '53 and that the states may therefore disci-
pline a lawyer for soliciting employment under circumstances 
likely to result in harmful consequences. 54 The Court found that 
Ohralik had indeed breached this standard by approaching two 
young accident victims at a time when they were incapable of mak-
ing considered judgments or of safeguarding their self-interests.55 
The Court also found fault with his use of a concealed tape record-
er56 and with his deceptive statements to the women,57 although it 
did not rest its decision on these latter two grounds. 58 
Whatever the wisdom of using these particular cases for enun-
ciating the permissible scope of state regulation, one must still de-
termine their effect on current state solicitation rules. The discus-
sion below will consider the minimum changes required to bring 
state rules into line with the Court's rulings in Primus and 
Ohra/ik. 59 
•
2 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, the Court held that certain forms of attorney advertising 
are protected by the first amendment. 
53 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 462. 
54 /d. at 464. 
55 Id. at 467. 
56 Id. 
57 
"He emphasized that his fee would come out of the recovery, thereby tempting the 
young women with what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistable offer." Id. 
•• "Under our view of the State's interest in averting harm by prohibiting solicitation in 
circumstances where it is likely to occur, the absence of explicit proof or findings of harm or 
injury is immaterial." Id. at 468. · 
Justice Rehnquist concurred for reasons stated in his dissent in Primus. Justice Marshall, 
in an opinion covering both cases, concurred in part and concurred in the judgments. He 
stated that his purpose in writing a separate opinion was "to highlight what I believe these 
cases do and do not decide, and to express my concern that disciplinary rules not be utilized 
to obstruct the distribution of legal services to all those in need of them." Id. at 468-69. 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
•
9 The question of desirability of making only the required changes is deferred to Part V 
infra. 
The term "commercial solicitation" will be used hereinafter to refer to solicitation in 
cases such as Ohralik, while the term "noncommercial solicitation" will be used to refer to 
solicitation in cases such as Primus. These terms relate more to the motivation behind solic-
itation than to the subject matter of the solicited suit, because even solicitation of personal 
injury claims is protected, in certain circumstances, under the rule in Primus. 
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In order to determine the effect of Primus on noncommercial so-
1 icitation, three questions must be answered: who may solicit 
under the rule in Primus, what kind of solicitation is protected by 
that rule, and what changes to state rules are necessary in light of 
that decision. 
1. Who may solicit under the rule in Primus-It should be noted 
that in the Court's four previous solicitation cases no attorneys had 
actually been disciplined.60 Prior to Primus and Ohra/ik, there was 
some question as to who might solicit under the protection of the 
Constitution-whether all group members could do so, or only 
non-lawyer group members.61 When the ABA drafted its solicita-
tion provisions, it gave these prior cases a narrow construction, al-
lowing attorneys to be recommended, employed, or paid by a 
group, or to "cooperate" with one,62 but nowhere explicitly allow-
ing group-affiliated attorneys to directly solicit. 
In Primus, the Court found fault with this formualtion, stating 
that the state rules "sweep broadly," and prohibit a group-
affiliated attorney from ever giving unsolicited advice to a layper-
son that he or she take advantage of the group's legal services. 63 
The Court also stated that such a formulation has a potential chil-
ling effect on cooperative activity to provide legal services and that 
it might permit "discretionary enforcement against unpopular 
causes.' ' 64 
The Court stopped short, however, of declaring the rules uncon-
stitutional on their face. It held that "findings compatible with the 
First Amendment" could not have been made by the lower courts 
in Primus65 and thus avoided having to rule on the facial validity of 
the provisions. Implicit in the Court's holding, however, is that 
6° For a discussion of those cases, see Part II B supra. 
61 In the three union cases, the attorneys did not themselves solicit; rather, non-lawyer 
group members referred cases to the attorneys. The role of the attorneys in Button is a sub-
ject of disagreement. In discussing this aspect o(Button m his Primus dissent, Justice Rehn-
quisfstated tha·t the NAACP attorneys hacfplaye<1 only a limited role-in the group's solicita-
tion efforts, In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 444 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and that "(w]hile But-
ton appears to permit ... solicitation for political purposes by lay members of the organiza-
tion ... , it nowhere explicitly permits such activity on the part of lawyers." Id. at 445. The 
majority in Primus disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the attorneys in Button 
were involved in the group's actual solicitation efforts and that the holding in Button pro-
tected the NAACP's legal staff as well as its lay members. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 425 n. 16. 
62 See DR 2-103(0), supra note 12. 
83 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 433. 
6< Jd. 
6
' Id. at 434. 
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group-affiliated attorneys may themselves solicit. 66 
2. When solicitation is protected by the rule in Primus-It is clear 
that some solicitation involving "political expression and associa-
tion" comes within the protection of Primus. 67 U nfortun-
ately, the Court formulated no explicit test in either Primus or 
Ohra/ik for determining what types of solicitation are protected. 
The only language that is helpful appears in a footnote in Primus, 
where the Court stated that the line between protected and unpro-
tected solicitation is based "in part on the motive of the speaker 
and the character of the expressive activity. " 68 With respect to 
"motive," it is almost certain that the solicitation will not be pro-
tected under Primus if the motive behind solicitation is the pros-
pect of pecuniary gain. 69 One of the issues in Primus was whether 
the fact that the ACLU receives court-awarded attorneys' fees re-
moves its solicitation from the protection which would otherwise 
be granted. The Court stated that solicitation by the ACLU was 
protected, notwithstanding such awards, because the organization 
is motivated by ''its widely recognized goal of vindicating civil 
liberties" rather than by "considerations of pecuniary gain. " 70 In 
Ohralik, on the other hand, "the lawyer was not engaged in associ-
ational activity for the advancement of beliefs and ideas; his pur-
pose was the advancement of his own commercial interests. " 71 
Thus, payment of compensation to the attorney will not remove so-
licitation from the protection of Primus so long as such compensa-
tion is not the attorney's motive for taking the case. 72 
The second aspect of the Court's apparent test - "character of 
66 Justice Rehnquist believed that while lay members of groups might properly solicit, 
lawyers should not be allowed to do so. He feared that lawyers may have persuasive powers 
not possessed by laymen, thus increasing the possibility of harm to the client and society. In 
re Primus, 436 U.S. at 445 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
67 What exactly is meant by the term "political expression" is open to question; discus-
sion of that problem will be deferred to Part IV B infra. 
68 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32. 
69 The reason for stating that this is "almost certain" will be explained in Part IV C 2, 
infra, ~here the motive test will be examined in more depth. - -
70 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 429-30. 
71 Id. at 438 n.32. 
72 Thus, the appropriate question is not whether there was a fee involved or if any fee 
involved was more than nominal; the appropriate question is whether the attorney's motiva-
tion was pecuniary. In Primus, the Court stated, "[i]n a case of this kind there are dif-
ferences between counsel fees awarded by a court and traditional fee-paying arrangements 
which militate against a presumption that ACLU sponsorship of litigation is motivated by 
considerations of pecuniary gain .... "Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that 
the fees involved were small was not conclusive on the question of motivation; it merely 
"militated against a presumption" of pecuniary motivation in the context of that case. In 
other types of cases, a court-awarded fee might very well be the attorney's motive for solic-
itation; not all attorneys are fortunate enough to be able to command substantial fees. One 
may, therefore, offer two caveats for attorneys. First, the fact that a fee is small will not 
foreclose inquiry on the question of motivation. Second, attorneys should be aware that the 
larger the fee, the more difficult it will be to prove that their motivation was not pecuniary. 
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the expressive activity" - is more difficult to clarify. In Primus, 
the Court consistently speaks in terms of two factors, "political 
expression" and "association." It is unclear, however, whether 
both of these factors must be present or if only one is sufficient to 
protect the soliciting attorney. 73 The Court's previous solicitation 
decisions provide some guidance on this issue. In Button, 74 both 
political expression and association were involved, and the solic-
itation was held to be protected. In the three cases involving un-
ions,75 only one of these factors - association - was present, but 
the solicitation was nevertheless held protected. All three cases in-
volved personal injury suits which could not fairly be characterized 
as "political." By contrast, in Ohralik, neither political expression 
nor association was involved and the solicitation was held unpro-
tected. It thus appears that at least one of these factors must-be 
present for the solicitation to be protected. 
The only type of case not yet considered by the Court is one in 
which an attorney who is not group-affiliated solicits a political ex-
pression case. As the union cases demonstrate,76 the exercise of 
associational freedom, standing alone, will satisfy the "character 
of the expressive activity" aspect of the test; whether the exercise 
of political expression, standing alone, will do so, remains a matter 
of speculation. 
Primus is capable of both a broad and narrow reading. At its 
broadest, it would protect solicitation if the attorney's motive is 
proper, the solicitation involves associational rights, and the attor-
ney engages in no "misconduct" during the act of solicitation. 77 
The important limitation upon solicitation under this broad in-
terpretation is that the attorney engage in no "misconduct." In 
cases such as Primus, an attorney may be disciplined for solicita-
tion which in fact involves certain types of "misconduct. " 78 By 
comparison, in Ohralik, the attorney was not disciplined for any 
actual misconduct, but for soliciting in improper circumstances. 79 
73 The Court refers at several points to ''political expression or association," see, e.g., In 
re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added), while at other points it refers to "political ex-
pression and association." Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court stated in 
Ohralik that "a lawyer who engages in solicitation as a form of protected political associa-
tion generally may not be disciplined without proof of actual wrongdoing .... '' Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 462-63 n.20 (emphasis added). · 
74 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For a discussion of Button, see notes 17-22 and 
accompanying text supra. 
75 See notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra. 
1• 1d. 
77 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 462-63 n.20. This broad interpretation is 
supported by the Court's statement in Ohralik that, "we hold today in Primus that a lawyer 
who engages in solicitation as a form of protected political association generally may not be 
disciplined without proof of actual wrongdoing that the state constitutionally may pros-
cribe." Id. 
78 ln re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434. See note 80 and accompanying text infra. 
79 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 467-68. 
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The problem, then, under this broader interpretation is to deter-
mine what is meant by "misconduct. " 80 
Primus can also be interpreted narrowly. As the majority in 
Primus suggested, different results might have obtained if Primus 
had received any benefit from the solicitation;81 if her income had 
depended in any way on the outcome of the litigation; 82 if the 
lawyers conducting the litigation would have received a share of 
any court-awarded attorneys' fees;83 if Williams had "communi-
cated unambiguously a decision against litigation'' prior to the time 
Primus sent her the letter; 84 if the solicitation had been conducted 
in person;85 if the legal services had not been offered free of 
charge;86 or, finally, if "an innocent or merely negligent misstate-
ment were made by a lawyer on behalf of an organization engaged 
in furthering associational or political interests. " 87 If the Court 
were to hold that the presence of one or more of these factors 
would make solicitation unprotected, then Primus would be nar-
rowed considerably. 88 
3. Changes to State Laws Required By Primus - Primus re-
quires no dramatic changes to state solicitation rules governing 
noncommercial solicitation.89 One change that should be made is 
that group-affiliated attorneys, as well as lay members of such 
80 In coming to the conclusion that Primus could not be disciplined, the Court stated that 
"[t]he record does not support appellee's contention that undue influence, overreaching, 
misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy actually occurred in this case." In re Primus, 436 
U.S. at 434-35. See text accompanying note 45 supra. It later stated: "[n]or does the record 
permit a finding of a serious likelihood of a conflict of interest or injurious lay interference 
with the attorney-client relationship." Id. at 436. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that 
these would be culpable forms of misconduct. In addition, the Court mentions other forms of 
misconduct that may be grounds for discipline: that which is "misleading, overbearing or 
involves other features of improper influence," id. at 438; fraud, intimidation, and other 
forms of "vexatious conduct," Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 462; stirring up 
frivolous or vexatious litigation, Primus, 436 U.S. at 435; and assertion of fraudulent claims, 
debasing the legal profession, overcharging, and underrepresentation. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 
461. 
8
' See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 429-30 n. 21. 
82 Id. at 436 n.30. 
83 Id. at 430 n.24. 
84 Id. at 435 n.28. 
85 Id. at 435. 
86 Id. at 437. 
87 Id. at 438 n.33. 
88 As Justice Rehnquist points out in his dissenting opinion in Primus, "the Court care-
fully reserves judgment on factual circumstances in any way distinguishable from those pre-
sented here." Id. at 442-43 n.l (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
89 The Court in Primus did not declare South Carolina's solicitation provisions to be un-
constitutional; rather, it held that those provisions could not constitutionally be applied to 
Primus under the facts of her case. Id. at 439. Primus could have been decided on the basis 
of Button had it not been for two slightly distinguishing characteristics. See notes 41-42 and 
accompanying text supra. Furthermore, two of the Disciplinary Rules under which Primus 
had been sanctioned by the state, DR 2-103(O)(5)(a) and (c), were to apply, according to the 
statute, only if they were not prohibited by the "controlling constitutional interpretation at 
the time." See note 35 supra. In other words, the controlling constitutional interpretation, as 
expounded in Primus and Ohra/ik, is to be incorporated into the statute by reference. 
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groups, should be allowed to solicit.90 Thus, DR 2-103(0) of the 
1969 version of the ABA Code91 should be amended to read as fol-
lows: 
a lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organiza-
tion that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services 
to promote the use of his services or those of his partners 
or associates except as follows. He may cooperate in a 
dignified manner with, or recommend the use of his or 
other lawyers' services on behalf of any of the follow-
ing .... 
Several changes must also be made in the current ABA Code. 
First, DR 2-103(A)92 should be amended to read: "A lawyer shall 
not, except as authorized in DR 2-lOl(B) and DR 2-J0J(D), recom-
mend employment. ... " Second, DR 2-103(C)(2)93 should be 
amended to read: "He may cooperate with the legal service ac-
tivities of any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 
2-103(0)(1) through (4) and may recommend the use of his or other 
lawyers' services on behalf of such offices or organizations . ... " 
Finally, DR2-103(D) 94 should be amended as follows: "A 
lawyer ... may be recommended, employed, or paid by, or may 
cooperate with, or may recommend the use of his or other lawyers' 
services on behalf of, one of the following .... " 
States that have adopted the 1969 version of the ABA Code need 
not worry about having to delete DR 2-103(D)(5)(a),95 proscribing 
solicitation where the primary purposes of the organization include 
the delivery of legal services, since the rule is now prohibited by 
the controlling constitutional interpretation, at least when the rule 
is read literally .96 States having this version should, however, in 
the interest of clarity, amend DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) by adding to the 
end of the provision the clause, "unless such legal services are a 
form of political expression or association." It is reasonable to as-
sume that not every attorney will be familiar with the controlling 
constitutional interpretation in Primus. States using the current 
version of the ABA Code need make no changes, since that version 
has no provision corresponding to the 1969 version of DR 
2-103(D)(5)(a).97 
90 See Pan III B I supra. 
91 See oote 35 supra. 
92 See note 12 supra. 
9a Id. 
9< Id. 
95 See note 35 supra for the text of DR 2-103(0)(5)(a) of the 1969 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 
96 See note 41 and accompanying text supra. 
97 See note 12 supra. 
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Similarly, states having the 1969 version of the ABA Code may 
retain DR 2-103(D)(5)(c),98 proscribing solicitation where an or-
ganization derives a financial benefit from the rendition of legal 
services. The Court found no fault with this rule in Primus, holding 
instead that awards of counsel fees to the ACLU do not constitute 
"financial benefit. " 99 The current version of the ABA Code con-
tains language similar to DR 2-103(D)(5)(c) of the 1969 code in DR 
2-103(D)(4)(a). 100 States having the current version need not 
change their provisions so long as the courts do not construe ''pro-
fit" as including compensation that is merely ancillary to some 
non-pecuniary purpose. 
The only other significant change to the existing state laws de-
manded by Primus concerns DR 2-I04(A)(5), which allows an at-
torney to accept, but not seek, employment in a class action suit 
fromjoined parties. 101 In finding that this rule was unconstitution-
ally applied to Primus, the Court implied that an attorney may so-
licit class action suits under circumstances such as those in Primus. 
Thus, states should amend this rule by adding at the end of the pro-
vision the clause, "unless the class action involves political ex-
pression or association." 
Finally, the effect upon stat.e solicitation rules of the standard of 
care enunciated by the Court must be considered. The Court 
suggested that in Primus-type cases, the state may punish solicita-
tion only if it in fact involves certain types of misconduct. The 
ABA Code makes no reference to any such standard of care. The 
solicitation cases decided prior to Primus and Ohralik enunciated 
no such standard, since those cases considered whether certain 
types of solicitation were permissible, not whether any actual solic-
itation had been properly conducted. 
The states arguably are not required to incorporate the Primus 
standard of care into their solicitation provisions so long as they 
take it into consideration when applying those provisions to "pro-
tected" solicitation cases. In the interest of clarity, however, the 
states should include this standard in the appropriate provision. 
Otherwise, an attorney unaware of Primus who solicits protected 
cases might believe that he has an entirely free hand in soliciting 
such cases. States having the 1969 version of the ABA Code should 
add the following new provision as DR 2-103(D)(5)(e): "Any lawyer 
98 See note 35 supra. 
99 See note 42 and accompanying text supra. 
100 See note 12 supra. The relevant portion of DR 2-103(D)(4)(a) states: • 'such organization 
... is so organized and operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal 
services .... " 
101 The provisions are the same in both versions of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. See notes 13 and 35 supra. 
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cooperating with the legal service activities of any organization 
which engages in such activities as a form of political expression or 
association may not engage in [misconduct] in recommending the 
services of such organization or his services on behalf of such or-
ganization." States should also enumerate those forms of miscon-
duct which are prohibited. 102 For states having the current version 
of the ABA Code, such a provision might be added as DR 
2-103(D)( 4)(h). 
Thus, Primus requires little change in state law with regard to 
noncommercial solicitation. The effect of Ohralik on commercial 
solicitation, however, is somewhat greater. 
C. Effect of Ohralik on the Regulation of 
Commercial Solicitation 
The types of cases contemplated by Ohralik are those where, for, 
one reason or another, the solicitation does not meet all the criteria 
for protection under Primus. Attorneys who fall within Ohralik 
may be disciplined, the Court stated, for soliciting in "cir-
cumstances likely to result in the adverse consequences the State. 
seek to avert." 103 The principal question is whether commercial 
solicitation, without more, is punishable per se. 104 To say that 
commercial solicitation may be prohibited per se is to say that such 
speech is completely unprotected by the first amendment. Disci-
plinary Rules 2-103 and 2-104 of the ABA Code prohibit all com-
mercial solicitation per se except in certain enumerated cir-
cumstances.1 °5 Language in Ohra/ik, however, suggests that 
commercial solicitation may not be punished unless the attorney 
solicits in the prohibited types of circumstances or engages in mis-
conduct in fact. 106 An examination of commercial speech cases 
102 See note 80 supra, 
103 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 464. 
1 0
• The phrase "circumstances likely to result" will be discussed in detail in Part IV C 
infra. 
105 See notes 12-13 supra. 
106 In response to Ohralik's claim that the Court had to decide whether a state may disci-
pline him for solicitation per se, the Court said, "we agree that the appropriate focus is on 
appellant's conduct." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 463. The Court then 
enunciated what it called a "prophylatic" rule, allowing states to discipline a lawyer for so-
liciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in misconduct. 
Id. at 464. It seems very unlikely that the Court would have focussed so much attention on 
Ohralik's conduct if commercial solicitation were punishable per se; more likely, the Court 
would have held that, the act of solicitation having been proved, Ohralik could be disci-
plined. Furthermore, earlier in the opinion, the Court noted that, "[w]hile entitled to some 
constitutional protection, appellants conduct is subject to regulation in furtherance of im-
portant state interests." Id. at 459 (emphasis added). The logical conclusion is that the Court 
would hold unconstitutional an attempt by a state to discipline an attorney for solicitation 
per se. 
Because DR 2-103(A) prohibits commercial solicitation per se, a reasonable question at 
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leads to the conclusion that such solicitation is not punishable per 
se. 
In Bigelow v. Virginia, 107 the Court reversed a conviction for 
violation of a Virginia anti-abortion statute. The defendant had ad-
vertised an offer to make low-cost arrangements for legal abortions 
in New York. The Court upheld this advertisement, not only be-
cause abortions were legal in New York, but because it found the 
state's justification invalid. Virginia had claimed that the adver-
tisement, being commercial in nature, could be banned entirely. 
The Court responded that commercial aspects of speech do not de-
prive that speech of all first amendment protection. 108 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 109 the appellants had contended that the adver-
tisement of prescription drug prices was outside the protection of 
the first amendment because it was "commercial speech." The 
Court responded by reiterating its holding in Bigelow and interpret-
ing that decision as having abolished the notion of unprotected 
commercial speech. 11 0 Although the Court in Virginia Pharmacy 
admitted that commercial speech may be regulated to some ex-
tent, 111 it concluded that such speech is not subject to complete 
suppression by the state. 112 
Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy involved advertising which may 
be potentially less dangerous than solicitation. The fact remains, 
however, that both advertising and solicitation are forms of com-
mercial speech, and although they may be subject to different de-
grees of regulation, the opinion in Virginia Pharmacy prohibits the 
state from complete suppression of commercial speech. 113 
this point is why the Court did not hold that provision to be unconstitutional. In light of the 
assertion in the text that solicitation is not punishable per se, one might argue that DR 
2-103(A) is void on grounds of "overbreadth." As a matter of fact, the Court considered the 
overbreadth argument, but rejected it, stating that "the justification for the application of 
overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context." Id. at 
462 n.20 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977)). 
In Ohralik, the Court was not faced with an instance of an attorney being disciplined for 
commercial solicitation per se. By framing the issue as whether a state may prohibit such 
solicitation in circumstances likely to result in misconduct, the Court avoided having to rule 
on the facial validity of DR 2-103(A). · 
107 421 u .s. 809 (1975). 
10
• Id. at 818. 
10
• 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For a further discussion of these and other cases relating to the 
"commercial speech doctrine," see Part IV A infra. 
110 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 
759-60. 
111 Id. at no. 
112 Id. at nl-72 n.24. 
113 The conclusion that commercial solicitation is not punishable per se finds support in 
Justice Marshall's opinion in Ohralik, in which he said, "what is objectionable about 
Ohralik's behavior here is not so much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the 
circumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he ac-
complished it." 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudg-
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Since these cases indicate that in-person commercial solicitation 
by individual attorneys is not punishable per se, DR 2-103(A) 1 14 
should be amended to read: 
A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-IOl(B), 
recommend employment as a private practitioner, of him-
self, his partner, or associate to a layperson who has not 
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer unless 
such a recommendation is made in circumstances not 
likely to result in [misconduct] and involves no [miscon-
duct] in fact. 
In addition, a new DR 2-104(A)(6) should be added to the current 
code, stating: "A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited ad-
vice to a layperson that he should obtain counsel or take legal ac-
tion may accept employment resulting from that advice if such ad-
vice was not given in circumstances likely to result in [misconduct] 
and involved no [misconduct] in fact." In this manner, both the 
seeking of employment and the acceptance of employment after 
giving unsolicited advice will be possible in circumstances where 
misconduct is not likely to occur. 1 15 
IV. THE VIABILITY OF THE COMMERCIAL/ 
NONCOMMERCIAL DISTINCTION AS A 
BASIS FOR STATE REGULATION 
OF SOLICITATION 
Thus far, the article has considered only the minimum changes 
that the states must make to their solicitation rules in the wake of 
Primus and Ohralik. The minimum changes proposed in Part III are 
based on the commercial/noncommercial distinction drawn by the 
Court. Whether these changes are desirable is another matter. This 
Part examines the Court's rationale in drawing distinctions be-
tween types of solicitation, and questions the desirability of basing 
state attorney solicitation laws on those distinctions. 
ment). Admitting that the instant cases did not involve honest, unpressured commercial so-
licitation, he expressed his doubt whether a state might constitutionally prohibit such solic-
itation. Id. at 476. 
11 
• See note 12 supra. 
11 5 These proposed changes are not required by Ohralik. The Court did not rule that DR 
2-103(A) is unconstitutional; by framing the issue in Ohralik as it did, it avoided the question 
of the facial validity of that provision. See note 94 supra. Thus, so long as the states do not 
actually use this provision to discipline an attorney for commercial solicitation per se, its 
current text will not be open to attack. The proposed changes are recommended solely for 
the sake of clarity. 
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A. The ''Commercial Speech Doctrine" 
Determining the protection to be accorded speech by drawing 
distinctions based on the commercial nature of that speech is noth-
ing new for the United States Supreme Court. Thirty-six years be-
fore Primus and Ohralik, the Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen 116 
reversed a lower court order enjoining a local police commissioner 
from interfering with petitioner's distribution of advertising leaf-
lets, in violation of a sanitary code provision forbidding the dis-
tribution of advertising matter in the streets. 117 The holding in 
Chrestensen has been interpreted as creating a "primary purpose" 
test: "[w]hen the primary purpose of the speech is 'commercial,' it 
falls within a category of speech that is not within the protection of 
the First Amendment." 118 
In a long line of cases, the Court further developed the commer-
cial speech doctrine .119 Beginning in 1973, however, the Court 
began to retreat from the doctrine. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rights, 120 the Court affirmed a 
cease and desist order against a newspaper for running certain 
types of advertisements, 121 but seemed to rely more on the fact 
that the advertisements promoted an illega) activity (discrimination 
in hiring) than on the mere fact of the advertisements' commercial 
nature. Two years later, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 122 the Court re-
versed petitioner's conviction under a Virginia anti-abortion sta-
tute, stating that "a State cannot foreclose the exercise of con-
116 316 u .s. 52 (1942). 
117 The Court stated in Chrestensen that it 
has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the 
freedom of communicating information and disseminating information and that, 
though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the 
public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these 
public thorough-fares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such 
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. 
Id. at 54. 
118 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 769 
(1978). This test arose from the fact that the leaflet involved in Chrestensen contained two 
messages: on one side it contained an advertisement for a commercial exhibition of a former 
Navy submarine and on the other side a message protesting the city's denial of wharfage 
facilities for the exhibition. "As to the political protest message ... the Court said it was 
'enough' that the message had admittedly been designed 'with the intent, and for the pur-
pose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance.'" Id. (quoting Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
316 U.S. at 55). 
119 See, e.g., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff d 
mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); 
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
120 413 u .s. 376 (1973). 
121 Specifically, the newspaper was held to have violated an ordinance prohibiting sex-
designated help-wanted advertisements under certain circumstances. 
122 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
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stitutional rights by mere labels." 123 The Court's 1976 decision in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers 
Counci/ 124 involved the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting 
the advertising of prescription drugs. The Court held that such ad-
vertising was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, 
noting that the commercial speech doctrine announced in Chres-
tensen had been greatly weakened by subsequent decisions. 125 
Unfortunately, the widely held belief that the category of com-
mercial speech was dead was not borne out by the opinions in 
Primus and Ohralik. The Court in Ohralik stated that it had not 
abandoned the "commonsense" distinction between commercial 
and noncommercial speech. 1 26 Indeed, the O hra/ik Court further 
explained that it had noted probable jurisdiction in the case in order 
to consider not only an aspect of the states' authority to regulate 
attorney conduct, but also the scope of protection of a "form of 
commercial speech." 127 Thus, for the Court, Ohra/ik was signifi-
cant not only for its effect on the regulation of professional con-
duct, but also for its effect on the commercial speech doctrine. The 
decision undoubtedly disappoints those who had thought that the 
category of commercial speech would soon be discarded. After a 
line of cases in which the Court refused to use the doctrine in a re-
strictive manner, the Court has suddenly revived it in order to jus-
tify restrictions on speech. The merits of the commercial speech 
doctrine are beyond the scope and purpose of this article. The dis-
cussion which follows will examine the merit of the Court's use of 
the doctrine in the context of attorney solicitation. 
B. "Political Expression and Association" 
as Distinguishing Characteristics 
In drawing a line between types of attorney solicitation cases, 
the Court in Primus used the factors of "political expression" and 
"association" to distinguish the solicitation in Primus from other 
123 Id. at 826 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429). 
12
• 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
125 Id. at 758-60. See also notes 107-112 and accompanying text supra. Three com-
mentators writing prior to Primus and Ohralik agreed that "[u]nder the most recent case law 
this category of speech [commercial speech] may well have been abandoned .... " J. 
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 118, at 767. In discussing the effect of 
Bigelow on attorney advertising and solicitation, Professor Monroe H. Freedman, an author-. 
ity on legal ethics, concluded that the decision "severely restricted, if it did not overrule 
Valentine v. Chrestensen'' and that "the present provisions of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, forbidding advertising and solicitation by lawyers, are constitutionally in-
valid." Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 192-93 (1976). 
126 436 U.S. at 455-56 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24). 
I 27 436 U .s. at 454. 
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forms of solicitation. 128 The term "association" is not nearly as 
problematic as the term "political expression". In neither Primus 
nor Ohralik did the Court give a satisfactory definition of "political 
expression." In Primus, the Court referred to the ACLU's goal of 
vindicating "civil liberties" through litigation. 129 The Court also 
referred to the '"freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of beliefs and ideas."' 130 If "political expression" is to 
be defined in terms of "beliefs and ideas," determining the scope 
of the "political expression" protection might prove impossi-
ble.131 The Court's recent experience in the area of defamation law 
amply demonstrates the pitfalls of using vague terms to distinguish 
between protected and unprotected speech .132 The same difficul-
ties can be foreseen in using the "political expression" test enun-
ciated in Primus to distinguish between valid and invalid types of 
solicitation. 
C. Standards of Care 
The distinctions which the Court has drawn among types of so-
licitation cases have a particular purpose - to impose differing 
standards of care on attorneys who solicit. In cases such as 
Primus, the states may punish only solicitation which involves 
misconduct in fact. In cases such as Ohralik, the states may punish 
128 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434. 
129 Id. at 430. In the oral argument in Primus, Justice Rehnquist asked Primus' counsel 
what was encompassed by the term "civil liberties." Counsel replied that it referred to 
"suits arising under the Bill of Rights or statutes amplifying those rights." Baker, Do 
Lawyers Have a First Amendment Right to Solicit?, 64 A.B.A.J. 364, 369 (1978). Thus, if 
"political expression" were equated with "civil liberties," one could possibly rely on the 
above definition. 
130 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 
(1958)). 
131 Thus in his dissenting opinion in Primus, Justice Rehnquist expressed his belief that no 
state "will be able to determine with confidence the area in which it may regulate prophylac-
tically and the area in which it may regulate only upon a specific showing of harm." 436 U.S. 
at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
132 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), the Court stated that "the deter-
minant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance 
involved concerns an issue of public or general concern .... " Id. at 44. Thus, the "public 
issue" test. was born. Justice Marshall dissented in Rosenbloom, stating, among other rea-
sons, that in using such a test, 
[t]he Court is required to weigh the nuances of each particular circumstance on its 
scale of values regarding the relative importance of society's interest in protecting 
individuals from defamation against the importance of a free press .... (W]hatever 
precision the ad hoc method supplies is achieved at a substantial cost in predictabil-
ity and certainty. 
Id. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Only three years later, the Court in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), abandoned the 
"public interest" test, stating, inter a/ia, that the test "would occasion the additional diffi-
culty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications 
address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not." Id. at 346. 
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an attorney for soliciting under circumstances likely to result in 
such misconduct. 133 At issue is the validity of such different stand-
ards, and the appropriateness of the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction as a basis for them. The Court seemed to rely on two 
premises in justifying the application of a lower standard of care in 
cases such as Primus: first, political expression and association de-
serve greater protection than commercial speech; 134 second, non-
pecuniary motivations of attorney solicitation minimize the chance 
that the potential client will be harmed. 135 Both of these premises 
are examined below. 
1. Political expression and association - Whether the solicitation of 
political expression cases warrants a lesser standard of care than or-
dinary commercial cases is subject to debate. Even assuming this so-
ciety's strong interest in seeing civil liberties vindicated, it does not 
follow that there is a qualitatively smaller interest in seeing other 
types of legal rights vindicated. Indeed, the Court seems 
to have forgotten the spirit of its decision in United Mine Work-
ers .136 There, the Court rejected the argument that the freedom of 
groups to solicit should be limited to political expression cases .137 
Moreover, in United Transportation Union, 138 the Court extended 
to groups the same freedom to solicit ordinary commercial cases as 
to solicit political expression cases. It thus makes little sense for 
the Court to impose a different standard of care in the context of 
"political expression" cases. To say that we should allow attor-
neys equal freedom to solicit commercial cases does not imply a 
lesser interest in political expression; rather it connotes a deeper 
concern over nonpolitical injuries. 
Whether solicitation involving associational freedom warrants a 
lesser standard of care is also subject to debate. The freedom of 
association may preclude the states from prohibiting people from 
joining together to achieve a lawful common goal, but that does not 
necessarily mean that the states should require one to join a group 
in order to pursue that goal. In giving group-affiliated attorneys 
greater freedom to solicit than non-affiliated attorneys, the Court is 
stating, in effect, that improper activity suddenly becomes proper 
the moment the attorney becomes affiliated. If the fact of group-
affiliation provided some assurance that a potential for harm would 
be minimized, then there might be a basis for a distinction founded 
on such affiliation. A group-affiliated attorney who solicits an in-
133 /n re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438-39. 
134 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 458-59. 
m In re Primus, 436 U.S. at429-31; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at461 n.19. 
136 389 U.S. 217 (1967). See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra. 
137 See note 29 supra. 
138 401 U.S. 576 (1971). See notes 30.31 and accompanying text supra. 
170 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
jured person, however, is as likely to cause harm to that person as 
a non-affiliated attorney. It may be true that groups select only 
those attorneys whom they feel are trustworthy. Under both the 
ABA Code 139 and dictum in Primus, 140 however, groups are for-
bidden from interfering with the attorney-client relationship. Thus, 
a group lawyer is perfectly free to handle a case any way he wants. 
Of course, groups may exert a certain tempering influence on their 
attorneys because they can sanction improper solicitation by those 
attorneys. That influence, however, may also be exerted by the 
state's attorney disciplinary agency. If disciplinary agencies are in-
effective, the best solution is to reform them, rather than to dele-
gate the responsibility of regulation to lay groups to whom such 
regulation may be of only subsidiary importance. There seems, 
therefore, little reason to require a lesser standard of care in the 
solicitation of political expression and "associational" cases than 
in other types of cases. 
2. Non-pecuniary motive - The other justification for requiring 
a lesser standard of care in cases such as Primus, the attorney's 
motive, is also difficult to support. The Court's assumption is that 
there is less danger to potential clients where the motive behind so-
licitation is not pecuniary; conversely, where there is a pecuniary 
motive, a lawyer's judgment is presumably clouded by greed. 141 
Greed, however, is not the only passion which blinds a person's 
eyes. In his dissent in Primus, Justice Rehnquist expressed his be-
lief that there is a substantial danger that even civil liberties 
lawyers will allow their judgment to be distorted in their efforts to 
right the world's wrongs. 142 Justice Rehnquist's remarks suggest 
that it is wrong to assume that a client is in less danger when his 
case involves political expression than when his case involves per-
sonal injury. Perhaps the clearest example demonstrating the fal-
lacy of the "motive" distinction is that of the protection given un-
139 See DR 2-103(C)(2)(b), supra note 12. 
1 
•• "[A] State may insist that lawyers not solicit on behalf of lay organizations that exert 
control over the actual conduct of any ensuing litigation." In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 439. But 
see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
144 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 461 n.19. 
142 His exact statement was 
I cannot share the Court's confidence that the danger of such consequences is 
minimized simply because a lawyer proceeds from political conviction rather than 
for pecuniary gain. A State may reasonably fear that a lawyer's desire to resolve 
"substantial civil liberties questions" ... may occasionally take precedence over 
his duty to advance the interests of his client. It is even more reasonable to fear that 
a lawyer in such circumstances will be inclined to pursue both culpable and blame-
less defendants to the last ditch in order to achieve his ideological goals. 
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 445-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Smith, 268 S.C. 
259, 263, 233 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1977)) (footnote omitted). 
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ions to solicit the personal injury cases of their members. Attor-
neys cooperating with unions may solicit ordinary commercial liti-
gation from union members, despite the fact that those attorneys 
receive real financial benefit. Such solicitation has been upheld as 
an exercise of associational freedom. 143 Yet, it is difficult to be-
lieve that such attorneys are completely oblivious to the prospect 
of pecuniary gain. 1 44 
Another problem with this motive test is that it is a subjective 
one. 145 As Justice Rehnquist said in Primus, under a motive test 
solicitation would be "subject to manipulation by clever prac-
titioners .... [W]e may be sure that the next lawyer in Ohralik's 
shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct will come here cloaked 
in the prescribed mantle of 'political association' .... " 146 The 
majority in Primus admitted that a line based on motive and con-
tent of speech "will not always be easy to draw" 147 but dismissed 
the problem, saying, "that is no reason for avoiding the undertak-
ing." 148 As Justice Rehnquist said, and as this article agrees, such 
difficulty ''is a valid reason for avoiding the undertaking where a 
more objective standard is readily available." 149 
The principal fault with the Court's focus on the attorney's mo-
tive is that it obsc.ures the most important aspect of solicitation, 
namely, providing the consumer with reliable information. Regard-
less of the attorney's reasons for soliciting, the consumer is given 
valuable information about his or her legal rights and the availabil-
ity of legal services. Indeed, in both the previous solicitation cases 
and the Bates advertising case, the Court's main concern seemed to 
be the assurance of a free flow of information about legal rights 
143 See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra. 
144 Had Ohralik been a cooperating attorney with a union and had the two women been 
union members injured in work-related activity, his solicitation arguably would have been 
protected. Unfortunately, as the Court said, Ohralik "was not engaged in associational ac-
tivity for the advancement of beliefs and ideas; his purpose was the advancement of his own 
commercial interests." In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32. It strains belief, however, to say 
that attorneys cooperating with unions are motivated not by their commercial interests but 
rather by the prospect of associational activity for the advancement of beliefs and ideas. It 
might be argued that the Court has weighed this commercial motivation of union attorneys, 
and has decided that the freedom of association won. It this were true, however, freedom of 
association would also justify protecting solicitation by civil rights groups; yet, as shown, 
the Court has required that such groups not be motivated by the prospect of pecuniary gain. 
It follows that both types of groups should be required to demonstrate non-pecuniary moti-
vation, since it is inconceivable that the Court intended to place greater restrictions on civil 
rights groups than on unions. 
145 See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra. 
146 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
147 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32. 
1•a 1d. 
149 Id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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and services, rather than the benefits accruing to attorneys. 150 In 
Ohra/ik, the Court paid lip service to the former of these interests 
but minimized the potential for benefit to the consumer, stating 
that solicitation may be one-sided and thus harmful, and that under 
the states rules, attorneys are not precluded from giving advice about 
legal rights - they merely cannot accept employment as a result of 
that advice.151 
These rationales are unpersuasive. With regard to the latter 
rationale, many attorneys will simply not feel it worth their time to 
give free legal advice. Attorneys may have a duty to assist laymen, 
but they still have to make a living. The first rationale, on the other 
hand, assumes that it is better to protect against a potential for 
harm in some instances of solicitation than to assure the provision 
of valuable information in most, if not all, such instances. 152 
Thus, the Court's approach in Ohralik appears to be a reversal of 
that taken previously. Benefit to the attorney and benefit to the 
consumer go hand-in-hand and cannot be severed quite as neatly as 
attempted by the Court. A more objective approach would be to 
focus on the character of the conduct involved rather than mo-
tive.15a 
3. Desirability of the standards of care imposed - Perhaps more 
important than the issue of different standards of care based on the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction is the question whether the 
particular standards themselves are desirable. 
Essentially, the Court is concerned with three classes of attorney 
behavior. The first class covers misconduct that is inherently in-
jurious, such as invasion of privacy, while the second includes 
misconduct that carries a probability of resulting injury, such as 
misrepresentation. 154 These two classes are related in that they are 
concerned with the way the attorney conducts himself during the 
act of solicitation. In contrast, the third class relates to the cir-
150 In referring to those four solicitation cases in Bates, the Court said, "[u]nderlying 
them was the Court's concern that the aggrieved receive information regarding their legal 
rights and the means of effectuating them." Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.32 
om). 
151 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 457-58. 
152 In his separate opinion in Ohralik, Justice Marshall decried the Court's neglect of this 
informational aspect of solicitation, stating that such an interest is substantial whether or not 
it occurs in a commercial context, and that it deserves as much protection as the interests 
protected in Bates. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 474 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
153 Id. 
154 Lying to someone, by itself, does not injure a person; a lie causes injury only if one 
relies upon it to his detriment. In the case of misconduct such as deception, then, the Court 
is saying that the probability is so high that such misconduct will cause actual injury that it is 
properly proscribed. In fact, the Court recognized this distinction between solicitation 
which is inherently injurious and that which is not. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 
U.S. at 466 n.27. 
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cumstances in which the act of solicitation is carried out. An attor-
ney falling within Primus need only refrain from engaging in the 
misconduct contained in the first two classes. An attorney falling 
within Ohralik, however, must also refrain from solicitation in 
"circumstances likely to result in misconduct." 155 
Unfortunately, it is not clear what circumstances are encompas-
sed by this rule. The Court described such circumstances as those 
"inherently conducive" to misconduct. 1 56 Arguably, improper 
circumstances include soliciting a person while he or she is hos-
pitalized or shortly thereafter .157 Other circumstances analogous 
to this would be funerals, the scenes of accidents, or any other 
situation which can be expected to be particularly traumatic for 
those involved. Unfortunately, the phrase "circumstances likely to 
result in misconduct" could be interpreted as covering virtually all 
solicitation. For example, an unscrupulous attorney might be will-
ing to deceive a potential client who has little education, and courts 
might apply this standard to any attorney who solicits a person 
with little education. This interpretation is not as extreme as it 
seems, particularly in light of the Court's statement in Ohralik that 
"the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a 
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally 
solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person." 158 
With such a pronouncement to guide them, lower courts could 
interpret the Ohralik standard to cover almost any type of situa-
tion. 
Assuming arguendo that the Ohra/ik standard is capable of defin-
ition, inquiry needs to be focussed on the deterrent value of that 
standard, since the purpose of solicitation rules is to prevent injury 
to the public. The Court in Ohra/ik justified its rule on two grounds. 
First, the Court said that under adverse circumstances, "it is not 
unreasonable for the State to presume that in-person solicitation by 
lawyers more often than not will be injurious to the person solic-
ited." 159 This presumption, however, is not unreasonable only if 
one believes that the majority of lawyers are unscrupulous. The 
anti-misconduct rule of Primus is sensible because certain types of 
misconduct are inherently injurious while others carry a very high 
155 In the remainder of this article, the term "anti-misconduct rule" will be used to refer to 
the Primus 11.de, while the term• 'prophylactic rule" will be used to refer to the Ohralik rule. 
158 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 464. 
157 In Ohralik, the attorney was disciplined for soliciting McClintock while she was lying 
in traction in her hospital room and for soliciting Holbert when, as he knew, she had just 
been released from the hospital. In such circumstances, as the Court said, "they were espe-
cially incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting their own 
interests." 436 U.S. at 467. 
158 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 465 (footnote omitted). 
159 /d. at 466 (footnote omitted). 
174 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
probability of resulting in injury. By comparison, the probability 
that solicitation in improper circumstances will result in miscon-
duct is much lower. 
The second justification offered for the Ohralik standard is that 
since in-person solicitation often takes place with no third parties 
present, it would be difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof 
of what had occurred, especially if the consumer were distressed at 
the time of solicitation. 160 Thus, the Court reasoned, it would be 
more difficult to prevent misconduct by soliciting attorneys if the 
states were required to prove actual misconduct in addition to so-
licitation in improper circumstances. 161 In effect, the Court is mak-
ing the law easier to break so that those who break it can be caught 
more easily. Unfortunately, the Court neglected to consider how 
the solicitation itself is to be proven. If a complainant cannot prove 
that the attorney had, for example, intimidated or deceived him, it 
is at least as probable that the complainant will be unable to prove 
that solicitation had even occurred. It would still be the word of the 
attorney against the word of the complainant, the very situation the 
Court sought to avoid in enunciating a prophylactic rule. Even as-
suming that solicitation can be proven, an enforcement rationale is 
valid only if unscru"pulous attorneys so outnumber scrupulous ones 
that it is worthwhile to deter the "good" solicitation in the course of 
deterring the ''bad.'' 
Thus, the justifications given by the Court for a prophylactic rule 
in Ohralik-type cases are unpersuasive. A prophylactic standard 
can be justified only if it is more effective in preventing improper 
solicitation than an anti-misconduct standard. Admittedly, in many 
settings such as hospital rooms, funerals, and the like, it would be 
easy to prove that solicitation had occurred in improper cir-
cumstances because these circumstances are presumptively im-
proper. In situations where location need only be shown, then, a 
prophylactic rule is perhaps justified; the ease with which ''impro-
per circumstances" is shown in such cases would deter solicita-
tion .162 In other situations, however, it would not be as easy to 
prove that "improper circumstances" existed. An example is 
where the location is proper but the solicited person is in no condi-
tion to discuss matters of such import. 163 In such situations, 
moreover, an attorney might never know in advance whether a po-
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Of course, both scrupulous and unscrupulous attorneys alike would be deterred but 
this result is justified on the ground that solicitation in such circumstances would also 
amount to an invasion of privacy, which constitutes actual, as opposed to probable, injury. 
163 An example is a person who is emotionally upset or under the influence of alcohol or a 
drug which affects perception and reason. 
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tential client was capable "of making informed judgments or of as-
sessing and protecting [his or her] own interests." 164 
Of course, an attorney who is unscrupulous enough to engage in 
misconduct and who is willing to take the chance that misconduct 
could not be proven, would probably also be willing to take the 
chance that a complainant could not prove that the solicited person 
was in no condition to discuss legal matters. At the same time, a 
scrupulous attorney who takes disciplinary rules seriously might be 
deterred from ever soliciting. Such an attorney will have realized 
that he might not know, prior to the act of solicitation, whether the 
potential client was capable of rational judgment. If he solicits a po-
tential client who had previously taken a handful of tranquilizers, 
he will be guilty of a breach of the Ohralik rule, even though he was 
unaware of the person's condition, or even if he stops soliciting 
upon becoming aware of it. Under the Court's scheme, then, the 
"good" attorneys would be deterred and most "bad" attorneys 
would not, precisely the opposite effect which solicitation rules 
seek to attain. 
Thus, the standards of care enunciated by the Court are not only 
based on distinctions of dubious value, but would probably work in 
a counterproductive manner. The next Part of this article will 
examine a potentially more useful scheme of regulation. 
V. BEYOND Primus AND Ohralik: LIBERALIZATION OF STATE 
SOLICITATION LAWS 
In the preceding Part, this article attempted to demonstrate that 
the commercial/noncommercial distinction drawn by the Court 
does not furnish a desirable basis for state regulation of attorney 
solicitation. This does not mean that a higher standard of care 
should be imposed on attorneys in Primus-type circumstances. 
This article contends that all types of solicitation deserve protec-
tion, and that attorney solicitation rules should be liberalized be-
cause the present scheme is discriminatory and restricts the pub-
lic's access to legal services. This Part will examine the reasons 
supporting these conclusions. 
A. Arguments Favoring Liberalization 
I. Discrimination between attorneys - A review of the current 
ABA solicitation rules demonstrates how the rules discriminate 
against certain classes of attorneys. Under the present scheme, 
••• Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 467. 
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lawyers cooperating with groups may solicit cases whether the sub-
ject matter is commercial or noncommercial. By contrast, the 
lawyer who is not group-affiliated must wait for clients to knock on 
the door. Under DR 2-104 of the ABA Code, lawyers not affiliated 
with groups may accept solicited cases under certain cir-
cumstances; for example, attorneys are allowed to solicit close 
friends and relatives. 165 However, the exception permitting the so-
licitation of former clients "if the advice is germane to the former 
employment" 166 operates in a discriminatory manner. If an attor-
ney has had clients who have continuous, as opposed to occa-
sional, dealings with the law, that attorney may solicit. 167 Fur-
thermore, Ethical Consideration (EC) 2-4 of the Code expressly al-
lows attorneys to solicit "regular" clients in addition to former 
ones. 168 Yet a great proportion of lawyers deal with clients who 
have only specific legal problems, for example, a real estate trans-
action, divorce, or personal injury. Once such matters are ended, 
there is little or no possibility that matters "germane to the former 
employment" will ever arise. Nor is it likely that such clients will 
become "regular" clients. The result is that many individual prac-
titioners and small legal partnerships may never be able to solicit 
under the exceptions provided by DR 2-104. This situation is 
perhaps most onerous to young attorneys who wish to start their 
own practice. 169 
Thus, the current scheme produces a situation where those at-
torneys who have the greatest need of finding business are not al-
lowed to solicit (other than close friends and relatives), while those 
who have the least need of finding business are allowed to solicit. 
One of the principal arguments in favor of liberalizing attorney so-
licitation is that the current scheme gives established lawyers a de-
cided competitive advantage over others .1 70 The most frequent re-
16! See DR 2-104(A)(l), supra note 13. 
166 Id. 
167 For example, a lawyer who has represented a business with regard to its tax matters 
may solicit employment whenever the tax laws change. 
168 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-4 
(Im). See also id. Canon 2, n.82 and DR 2-104(A)(I), supra note 13. 
169 As Justice Marshall said in Ohralik, "[t]he Disciplinary Rules against solicitation fall 
most heavily on those attorneys engaged in a single practitioner or small-partnership form of 
practice - attorneys who typically earn less than their fellow practitioners in larger, 
corporate-oriented firms." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 475 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)(footnote omitted). 
170 As Professor Freedman has said, "what is clear is that the principal purpose of the 
antisolicitation rules is to limit competition among lawyers." M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S 
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 114 (1975). He later remarked that lawyers often take tax 
deductions for membership fees in country clubs on the ground that such fees are business 
expenses - in other words, a means of solicitation. Id. at 116-17. Prof. Freedman's asser-
tions are supported by In re Cohn, IO Ill. 2d 186, 196, 139 N.E.2d 301, 306 (1957)(Bristow;J ., 
concurring on consideration of petition for rehearing): 
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sponse to this argument is that if the Court is to allow solicitation in 
some circumstances, the "evil" should be contained as much as is 
constitutionally permissible. This response is weak in two re-
spects. First, it assumes that increased solicitation is an evil, which 
is by no means obvious. More importantly, however, the argument 
ignores the fact that restrictive solicitation rules allow one group in 
the legal community to maintain a great advantage over others. 
Given a choice between maintaining the current discriminatory 
scheme, which is intolerable to some, and allowing attorneys to so-
licit in any and all circumstances, which is intolerable to others, the 
most equitable solution is to achieve equality of opportunity, and 
to try to contain the real evils of solicitation as much as possible. 
2. Discrimination against consumers -The present scheme also 
discriminates against consumers of legal services. To the same ex-
tent that attorneys who are not group-affiliated have less leeway to 
solicit, clients who are not group-affiliated have less access to in-
formation regarding their legal rights. As one commentator noted, 
laypersons who are so powerless that they cannot organize their 
own litigation programs are in even greater need of the free flow of 
legal information than those who have such power. 1 71 Similarly, 
one federal court has said, "it would make no sense for an indi-
vidual's right of access to legal action to cease to exist, or not to 
come into existence at all, at the moment he ceases to belong to a 
group." 172 Liberalizing attorney solicitation rules would thus in-
crease the public's access to legal services. 173 The underutilization 
of legal services by certain groups is well-known; 1 74 increased so-
licitation would do much to alleviate this problem. 
Opponents of more liberal solicitation laws have argued that 
anti-solicitation rules do not prevent lawi'ers from 'informing those 
people that they have a claim. While this is true, it is also unrealis-
Nor is it amiss to note that opulent lawyers and large law firms who do not employ 
"runners" to attract business do spend large sums of money for memberships in 
country clubs, entertainment in fashionable surroundings and other similar 
amenities of social intercourse. That the primary purpose of these expenditures is 
the attraction of law business and not hospitality is attested by the fact that such 
lawyers regularly claim and the Internal Revenue Department regularly allows de-
ductions for these expenditures as "business" and not "personal" expenses. 
171 Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel 
Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1186 (1972). 
172 Freeman & Bass, P.A. v. State of N.J. Comm. of Invest., 359 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 
(D.N.J. 1'173), vacated on other g·rounds, 486 F.2d 176 (1'173). 
173 As Justice Marshall noted, "[m]any persons with legal problems fail to seek relief 
through the legal system because they are unaware that they have a legal problem and, even 
if they 'perceive a need', many 'do not obtain counsel ... because of an inability to locate a 
competent attorney."' 436 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgments) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977)). 
1 74 See generally Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 370-71 nn.22-23; B. CHRIST-
ENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970). 
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tic. Without a profit incentive many lawyers simply will not feel it 
is worth their while to give advice. Moreover, an attorney who ad-
vises someone of his rights does himself a disservice because he is 
forbidden by the ABA Code from accepting employment as a result 
of that advice. 1 75 It is somewhat unrealistic to expect attorneys to 
voluntarily negate their prospects for employment. Given the profit 
incentive, however, attorneys would be much more likely to give 
laypersons valuable information about their legal rights .1 76 
Canon Two of the ABA Code states, "A Lawyer Should Assist 
the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel 
Available." 1 77 If this Canon is to have more than token value, at-
torneys should have a duty, or at the very least, have the right, to 
"stir up litigation" when they are advising people of their rights 
and enabling them to redress grievances through the judicial sys-
tem .1 78 To summarize, liberalization of solicitation laws would 
both equalize competition and engender a freer flow of information 
to consumers. 
B. Arguments Against Liberalization 
The traditional arguments 179 against attorn~y solicitation fall 
into three classes. First is the argument that solicitation harms the 
dignity of the legal profession and that it would result in undue 
commercialization of the profession. This argument is based on an 
elitist view of the profession and arguably is not constitutionally 
supportable. 180 Second is the argument that solicitation would re-
sult in the "stirring up" of litigation, would induce the bringing of 
175 See DR 2-104, supra note 13. 
176 See Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 301, 374 (1970). 
117 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 
(1977). 
178 M. FREEDMAN, supra note 170, at 188. 
179 See generally Note, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 
U. CHI. L. REV. 674 {1958); Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Profession's Duty to 
Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 {1972); Comment, Controlling Lawyers by 
Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1970); Comment, 
Advertising, Solicitation, and Prepaid Legal Services, 40 TENN. L. REV. 439 (1973). In addi-
tion, the numerous amicus briefs filed in Primus and Ohralik contain extended discussions 
of these issues. 
180 Responding to this argument in the context of attorney advertising, the Court has said, 
"[s]ince the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism, the 
historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled." Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977). Because the ban on solicitation also originated as a rule 
of etiquette rather than as a rule of ethics, see H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210-11 (1953), the 
same reasoning would seem to apply to the historical reason for the restraint on solicitation. 
In his separate opinion in Ohralik, Justice Marshall said, "[a]sBates made clear, 'disdain' is 
an inadequate basis on which to restrict the flow of information otherwise protected by the 
First Amendment." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 475 n.6 (Marshall, J ., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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fraudulent claims, and would result in incompetent representation 
of clients. But these considerations do not, in themselves, support 
the independent ban on solicitation. 181 The last argument expres-
ses the legitimate fear that solicitation might result in overreaching, 
overcharging, misrepresentation, and invasion of privacy. These 
dangers do not, however, justify the broad prohibition against so-
licitation contained in current state solicitation rules. 182 Less re-
strictive alternatives are available to the states to insure that attor-
neys who engage in misconduct may be disciplined, while so-called 
"benign" solicitation is not thereby prevented. 183 
Another frequently-voiced objection to liberalized solicitation 
rules is that there would be a sudden onslaught of unethical solic-
itation. This objection is based on the questionable assumption that 
the current restrictive scheme is successful in preventing such so-
licitation. The relevant question, however, is not how many attor-
neys, in absolute terms, would solicit improperly, but how much of 
an increase in improper solicitation would result. As one attorney 
who commented on the liberal California proposals discussed 
below stated, "[t]hose inclined to solicit in an obnoxious manner 
are already doing so." 184 
The only way to assess the impact of liberalized rules is to com-
pare the number of reported complaints about solicitation in a 
jurisdiction that has changed from a restrictive to a liberal scheme. 
As yet, the only jurisdiction which has done so is the District of 
Columbia. The new rules, however, have only been in effect for 
abouteight months as of this writing, and thus, any data that might 
181 With regard to the "stirring up litigation" argument, the proper solution arguably is to 
increase the number of courts or decrease the available causes of action, not to decrease 
access to legal services. With regard to fraud, harassment, and incompetence, such miscon-
duct is already proscribed by the ABA Code. See AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109 (Acceptance of Employment), DR 6-101 (Failing to 
Act Competently), and DR 6-102 (Limiting Liability to Client) (1977). 
Consider also the Court's response in Bates to the argument that attorney advertising 
would induce the bringing of fraudulent claims: "The appropriate response to fraud is a 
sanction addressed to that problem alone, not a sanction that unduly burdens a legitimate 
activity." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 375 n.31. 
182 Interestingly, the author of one of the law review articles cited by the Court in Ohralik 
came to the conclusion that "there is little support for the contention that solicitation harms 
clients." See Note, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 674, 684 (1958). 
183 Justice Marshall defined "benign" solicitation as that which is conducted 
by advice and information that is truthful and that is presented in a noncoercive, 
nondeceitful and dignified manner to a potential client who is emotionally and phys-
ically capable of making a rational decision either to accept or reject the representa-
tion with respect to a legal claim or a matter that is not frivolous. 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,-436 U.S. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
184 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE SPECIAL 
CoMMITTEE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION app. C (Nov. 6, 1978). 
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be derived from the District's experience could not be considered 
conclusive evidence of the effect ofliberal rules. It is interesting to 
note, however, that seven months after the new rules became ef-
fective, the president of the D.C. Bar Association told the Ameri-
can Bar Association Committee on Advertising that "there had 
been few complaints about abuse of the new rules." 185 
A final objection to liberalized solicitation laws is that many at-
torneys would solicit who do not presently do so, and abuses which 
would not have occurred before will take place when attorneys 
"play it too close to the line." These potential costs, however, are 
outweighed by the potential benefits - both to attorneys and to 
society as a whole - that would flow from increased solicitation. 
C. Recent Proposals and "Safeguard" Provisions 
Within the past few years, there have been several proposals for 
liberalized solicitation laws. 1 86 The common thread running 
through these proposals is that they would, as a general rule, per-
mit attorneys ,to solicit, but would prohibit certain types of miscon-
duct, such as deception, undue influence, intimidation, overreach-
ing, promoting harassing litigation, and other types of "vexatious 
conduct.'' These rules would create no distinctions based on 
subject-matter of the solicited suit, motivation of the soliciting at-
torney, or presence of group-affiliation. 
These proposals, in effect, create only anti-misconduct rules -
the prohibitions mentioned above are directed at the attorney's 
conduct during the act of solicitation. In order to give further as-
surance that these rules will not be breached, and to protect against 
other dangers not directly involved in the act of solicitation, such 
as overcharging, the states may wish to add one or more of these 
"safeguard" provisions. In considering these safeguards, one must 
remember that they would apply to Primus- and Ohralik- type 
cases alike. Hence the safeguards must not unconstitutionally re-
strict the freedom to solicit granted in Primus. 
One of the main criticisms of liberalized solicitation is that it pre-
vents a free choice of lawyers because soliciting attorneys tend to 
be aggressive and the potential client may be inexperienced in hir-
185 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1979, at 12, col. 3. 
188 See Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of 
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 183, 197-203 (1976); 
Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Availability of Legal Counsel, 81 YALE L. J. 1181, 
1192-1200 (1974); 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,r 50,197 (1974) (Remarks of L. Bemstem, Chief, 
Special Litigation Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice); AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103 and DR 2-104 (Aug. 1977 
Amendment, Proposal B), 46 U.S.L.W. 11-12 (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977). 
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ing lawyers .187 Similarly, it is asserted that solicitation may be of-
fensive to clients because of the possible invasion of privacy .188 
There are several ways, however, in which the states may prevent 
these abuses. First, they can specifically prohibit the undesirable 
conduct, such as overreaching. 189 Second, they can specifically 
prohibit solicitation where it would constitute an invasion of pri-
vacy, preferably by listing certain settings where solicitation is im-
proper, such as hospitals, funerals, or scenes of accidents. Third, 
the states could require the soliciting attorney to provide the poten-
tial client with a list of other local attorneys who handle the same 
type of legal claim involved. This list could also give approxima-
tions of the fees charged by these attorneys which would help pre-
vent another alleged abuse of solicitation, namely, overcharg-
ing.190 Finally, the states could require attorneys who have been 
retained as a result of solicitation to give their client a "cooling-
off" period, such as 72 hours, during which the client could rescind 
the agreement without incurring any liability. Such a provision 
would be similar to those designed to protect consumers from 
door-to-door salesmen. 191 
The second safeguard, prohibiting solicitation in certain settings, 
is designed to protect against invasion of privacy; as such, it would 
be constitutional under Primus .192 The third safeguard, requiring 
the attorney to give the potential client a list of other local attor-
neys, might be perceived as an unconstitutional restriction on the 
freedom of groups to solicit. This safeguard, however, would only 
nominally burden such solicitation and is designed to help protect 
laypersons from attorneys who overreach. As the Court said in 
Primus, "[n]othing in this opinion should be read to foreclose care-
fully tailored regulation that does not abridge unnecessarily the as-
187 Note, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by lAwyers, 25 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 674, 683 (1958). 
188 Id. 
189 Two of the most far reaching proposals are the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, adopted as Rule X of the Rules Governing the Bar of the Dis-
trict of Columbia [hereinafter cited as DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE], and the PROPOSED 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, reprinted in STATE 
BAR OF CALIFORNIA REPORTS 4-6 (August, 1978) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED CALIFOR-
NIA Ru LES]. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CoDE DR 2-103(8)(2) and DR 104 (A)(2), and PRO-
POSED CALIFORNIA RULE 2-101(8)(2). 
190 The practice of listing fees might seem to conflict with the Court's decision in Goldfarb 
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Court struck down, on antitrust 
grounds, a minimum fee schedule promulgated and enforced by a state bar association. 
Goldfarb involved a "fixed, rigid price floor," 421 U.S. at 781, which attorneys were com-
pelled to obey. The proposal here would not raise the same problems unless, of course, the 
attorneys on the list conspired to fix prices. Merely listing the fees charged by attorneys is 
not substantially different from price advertising, which the Court upheld in Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
191 See, e.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Section 3.502. 
'92 Invasion of privacy is a form of misconduct prohibited by Primus. See note 80 supra. 
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sociational freedom of non-profit organizations." 193 The fourth 
safeguard, requiring a cooling-off period, is a modification of com-
mon law contract rules and would be constitutional under Primus, 
since it affects neither the attorney's behavior nor the cir-
cumstances of solicitation. 
Some attorneys might be unwilling to inform their clients of their 
right to a list of other attorneys and to rescind. Thus, the states 
might wish to enact a fifth safeguard, in the form of a statute of 
frauds provision. Such a provision could consist of two parts. 
First, attorneys would be required to have all their retainer agree-
ments reduced to writing, containing whatever terms the state 
deems essential. Since many attorneys already make this their 
practice, it would not be an onerous burden. Second, every re-
tainer agreement would be required to contain the following 
clauses in conspicuous type: 
IF YOUR ATTORNEY WAS THE ONE WHO 
STARTED CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO OF 
YOU, YOU HA VE THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: 
(1) Before you sign this agreement, you have the right to 
receive, from your attorney, a list containing the names of 
other attorneys in your area who handle claims like yours 
and estimates of the fees they charge. If your attorney re-
fuses to give you this list, or ifhe or she gives it to you and 
you decide you do not want to retain him or her, you do 
not have to sign this agreement. 
(2) You have the right to cancel this agreement within 72 
hours after you sign it without being under obligation to 
your attorney. 
By requiring that all retainer agreements be in writing and contain 
these clauses, states may insure that attorneys inform potential 
clients of their rights if they wish to make the agreement enforce-
able. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Court would hold such a 
statute of frauds provision unconstitutional when applied to attor-
neys falling within Primus. First, these requirements are well-
defined and would work no substantial hardship on attorneys. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, this safeguard is designed to ensure 
that the potential client makes an informed choice - an interest 
arguably worthy of protection even for pro bono civil rights plain-
tiffs.194 
193 In re Primus; 436 U.S. at 439. 
••• Just because a client is not charged a fee does not mean that client has nothing to lose. 
For example, arguably a person who brings a civil rights suit for the purpose of resolving a 
constitutional issue is opening himself to a greater danger of defamation than that to which 
he would ordinarily be exposed. In addition, the client will be subjected to the unpleasant-
ness of litigation (of which many are unaware) and may lose his cause of action under princi-
ples of resjudicata. 
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Finally, the states might wish to enact a safeguard which would 
prevent lawy~rs from taking advantage of consumers who are in-
capable of making rational judgments. Such a provision sounds 
perilously close to the prophylactic rule of Oralik which this article 
has previously criticized. 195 The three main faults with the Ohralik 
rule were (1) it could be interpreted to cover virtually any situation, 
thus deterring even "benign" solicitation; (2) it appeared to impose 
strict liability on the attorney; and (3) it was applicable only to cer-
tain classes of attorneys and certain classes of solicitation. The fol-
lowing provision, which is based on DR 2-103(A)(3) of the new Dis-
trict of Columbia Code, would avoid those defects: "A lawyer shall 
not solicit a potential client who is apparently in a physical or men-
tal condition which would make it unlikely that he or she could 
exercise reasonable, considered judgment as to the selection of a 
lawyer." 196 First, as used in both this proposed scheme and the 
D.C. Code, the provision would apply to all attorneys and all solic-
itation. Second, the provision narrowly defines the situations in 
which it would apply, which are those where a potential client 
needs the most protection. The rule would not, however, prevent 
an attorney from soliciting a consumer who happened not to be on 
the same educational level. Third, and most importantly, by using 
the word "apparently", the rule would eliminate strict liability and 
impose a fault requirement. Thus, an attorney soliciting a con-
sumer covered by this provision could not be disciplined unless the 
lawyer solicited while knowing (a subjective standard) or having a 
good reason to know (an objective standard) that the client was not 
in the proper condition. An attorney who came to this realization 
during the act of solicitation could not be disciplined if the attorney 
stopped soliciting upon reaching that realization .1 97 
It is likely that this last safeguard would be constitutional under 
Primus. First, it narrowly defines the situation in which it applies, 
thereby preventing, or at least minimizing, any potential "chilling" 
effects. Second, states have a compelling interest in preventing 
. even civil rights and union lawyers from persuading a person to sue 
when that person is unable to exercise rational judgment. In fact, 
solicitation in such circumstances could well be construed as 
undue influence, a form of misconduct already prohibited by 
Primus . 198 
1 95 See Part IV C supra. 
1 96 See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE DR 2-103(A)(3), note 189 supra. 
197 Because people are often in greatest need of an attorney during traumatic periods, 
states might wish to create an exception to this rule which would permit only solicitation by 
mail when the potential client is covered by this rule. 
198 See note 80 and .accompanying text supra. 
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D. Recent Statutory Revision 
There recently has been some statutory revision paralleling these 
proposed rules. On July 12, 1978, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals repealed its previous rules regarding attorney advertising 
and solicitation and enacted liberalized provisions. 199 California 
has also been considering a range of possible changes. First, on 
August 24, 1978, the Board of Governors of the State Bar of 
California tentatively approved liberalized provisions of its solic-
itation rules. 200 These proposals were submitted to the attorneys of 
California for their approval and, following an overwhelming nega-
tive response, the Board retracted them.201 Later, on November 6, 
1978, the California Board submitted another solicitation proposal 
that would have prohibited all oral solicitation but would have 
permitted solicitation by mail, including solicitation addressed to a 
particular client seeking employment for a specific matter.202 This 
rule would also have permitted attorneys to solicit former or pre-
sent clients and to respond to inquiries from potential clients.203 
Upon further consideration, however, the Board decided on No-
vember 17, 1978, to amend that proposal to prohibit all solicitation 
"specifically directed to a particular potential client regarding that 
potential client's particular case or matter and seeking professional 
employment for pecuniary gain. " 204 Thus, under the rule finally 
adopted by the Board for submission to the California Supreme 
Court, the only permissible commercial solicitation, other than that 
directed to past or present clients or in response to inquiries, is a 
"communication" sent by mail seeking employment generally, but 
not in relation to a particular case. In effect, this would be no more 
than a written advertisement; at best, it would straddle the line 
separating advertising from solicitation. 
The November 6, 1978 proposal would have allowed solicitation 
by mail. The Board apparently felt that even this extremely limited 
form of solicitation was too dangerous. By creating a distinction in 
the types of letters that may be mailed, the Board disregarded the 
advice of their own Special Committee on Lawyer Advertising and 
199 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, adopted as Rule X 
of the Rules Governing the Bar of the District of Columbia. 
200 PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RULES, reprinted in STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA REPORTS 4-6 
(August, 1978). 
201 Over 700 comments were received, running about eleven to one against the proposals. 
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION I (Nov. 6, 1978) [hereinafter 
cited as FINAL REPORT]. 
202 Id. Rule 2-IOl(B)(November 6, 1978 proposal) at 29-30. 
203 Id. at 31. 
20
• Rule 2-IOl(B), Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of 
California (Nov. 17, 1978). 
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Solicitation that such a scheme would ''create a burdensome en-
forcement problem in distinguishing in each particular case, a pro-
hibited writing from a permitted writing. " 205 
As finally adopted, the California rule incorporates by reference 
the current constitutional interpretation with regard to attorney so-
licitation. 206 This reference at least insulates the rule from an ad-
verse constitutional ruling. It would probably be unconstitutional, 
however, to discipline an attorney for commercial solicitation with 
regard to a particular case if that solicitation were conducted in 
faultless circumstances and involved no misconduct in fact. 207 
Despite California's rejection of the liberal proposal of August 
24, 1978, this proposal, along with the new District of Columbia 
Code, furnishes insight into the potential for liberalized solicitation 
provisions. Both the District of Columbia and proposed California 
rules208 abolish all the distinctions created by the United States 
Supreme Court among types of attorneys and types of solicitation. 
Both sets of rules allow in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain 
but prohibit various forms of misconduct. 209 The two schemes also 
carefully describe what is meant by "misrepresentation."210 
The two sets of rules also contain several "safeguard" provi-
sions. Both schemes, for example, would prohibit solicitation 
where the potential client was incapable of rational judgment,2 11 
20
• See FINAL REPORT, supra note 201, at 6. 
The following hypotheticals should demonstrate the problems that might result from the 
rule as finally proposed. Suppose that an attorney is aware that a certain person has just 
been in an accident giving rise to a personal injury claim. The attorney sends this person a 
letter stating that he handles personal injury claims, but makes no reference to the accident. 
Or suppose the attorney sends the same letter to the same person, but he does not know that 
the person has been in an accident; in other words, the mailing is a complete coincidence. If 
a complainant could somehow convince a Disciplinary Board that the attorney knew the 
person had been in an accident, the attorney would be subject to discipline. Finally, suppose 
an attorney sends someone a letter stating in general terms that he handles divorce cases. 
Since a substantial number of married couples contemplate divorce at one time or another, 
such a letter might well be construed as a prohibited writing. An attorney might be subjected 
to discipline because he was not acquainted with the intimate details of the life of every per-
son to whom he mails a letter. Because of these problems, the rule as adopted by the Board 
might deter many attorneys from sending any letters at all. 
206 Rule 2-lOl(B), Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of 
California (Nov. 17, 1978). 
207 See Part III C supra. 
208 In the remainder of this article, the term "proposed California rule" will be used to 
refer to the liberal proposal of August 24, 1978. 
20
• See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CoDE DR 2-103(8)(2) and DR 2-104(A)(2), supra note 19'>; 
PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RULE 2-101(8)(2), supra note 200, 
210 See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE DR 2-101(8), supra note 199; PROPOSED CALIFOR-
NIA RULE 2-lOl(A), supra note 200; Suggested Standards for Attorney Communications, 
PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 200, at 5. 
211 See note 196 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the District of Columbia 
rule. The parallel proposed rule in California is PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RULE 2-101(8)(1), 
supra note 200. Because the proposed California rule appears to make the attorney strictly 
liable, it is not recommended that the states adopt it; the D.C. formulation is preferable. 
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and would prohibit attorneys from compensating or rewarding 
anyone for recommending or securing employment for them.212 
With regard to the protection of privacy, the proposed California 
rules contain provisions having no counterpart in the District of 
Columbia rules. The former would prohibit solicitation when the 
consumer has informed the attorney that the consumer ''does not 
want to receive communications" from the attorney,213 when the 
consumer is already represented by counsel and the attorney 
knows that or has failed to inquire about it, 2 14 or where the poten-
tial client "has a reasonable expectation of privacy. " 215 This arti-
cle does not recommend that these latter two rules be adopted by 
states wishing to liberalize solicitation. Although no one would 
condone an attempt by an attorney to persuade someone to break a 
retainer agreement with another attorney, if a person merely has an 
on-going relationship with an attorney, there seems to be little rea-
son to prohibit another attorney from making that person a better 
offer. In other words, the California rule would have a definite an-
ticompetitive effect. Moreover, the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" rule could be construed as covering virtually all solicita-
tion and would thus defeat the purpose of liberal solicitation rules. 
The schemes outlined in the preceding sections contain many 
exceptions to the general rule of freedom to solicit. While these 
proposals would certainly liberalize current law, they would not 
work a revolutionary change on it. The principal effect of most of 
these proposed revisions would be to eliminate the various distinc-
tions among forms of solicitation which are now drawn by state so-
licitation rules; this approach would not only increase and equalize 
competitive opportunities among lawyers but also among consum-
ers. These proposals would by no means give attorneys the unfet-
tered license to engage in "ambulance-chasing," for example. Al-
though in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain would be permissi-
ble for all attorneys, the outlined restrictions would help curb pos-
sible abuses. Those practices which most offend attorneys' sense 
of dignity would continue to be prohibited. While these proposals 
do not purport to curb all abuses, it is unrealistic to expect any 
scheme of regulation to accomplish that goal. Current state solic-
itation rules, with their stringent and broad prohibitions, have not 
curbed all abuses. As long as there are unscrupulous attorneys, 
there will be unscrupulous solicitations. The best that can be ex-
212 See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE DR 2-103(C), supra note 199; PROPOSED CALIFOR· 
NIA RULES 2-lOl(c), 2-1O8(B), and 3-1O2(B), supra note 200. 
213 See PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RULE 2-1Ol(B)(3), supra note 200. 
214 See PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RULE 2-IOl(B)(4), supra note 200. 
215 See PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RULE 2-1Ol(B)(5), supra note 200. 
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pected - and the goal of these proposals - is to weed out as much 
"bad" solicitation, while simultaneously permitting as much 
"good" solicitation as possible. With regard to the real evils of so-
licitation, the proposed revisions are as stringent, if not more so, 
than current state rules. The difference is that the proposed 
schemes would not seek to prevent all solicitation in order to dis-
courage misconduct. The current laws use a bludgeon; the pro-
posed schemes would use a rapier. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The recent decisions in Primus and Ohralik compel little, if any, 
change in the current state attorney solicitation rules. The current 
scheme of regulation, however, is based on a commercia_l/non-
commercial speech distinction which is difficult to support in the 
context of attorney solicitation. The types of solicitation subsumed 
under each category are not so different that they should be sub-
jected to differing degrees of protection. 
At the very least, the publicity generated by the decisions in 
Primus and Ohralik may cause many states, as it did California, to 
reconsider their present stand on attorney solicitation. The states 
are urged not to follow the scheme of minimum protection created 
by the Court in Primus and Ohralik, but rather to undertake a com-
plete overhaul of their present solicitation rules. Through careful 
drafting, the states should reasonably be able to balance the needs 
of society against the legitimate dangers of increased attorney so-
licitation. Although such attempts might result in rules more com-
plex than the present ones, "[c]areful draftsmanship is a slight bur-
den to bear, especially where freedom of speech and honorable, 
life-long careers are at stake. " 2 16 
No one really knows what will happen if liberalized provisions 
are enacted. Attorney solicitation is not a scientific phenomenon 
which can be predicted with certainty. It is just as reasonable to 
believe that increased solicitation will result in great benefits as it is 
to believe that it will result in great abuses. Whether abuses are 
prevented depends as much, or more, on how the rules are en-
forced as on how they read. The states should remember that if 
they enact liberalized solicitation laws, they are not bound by that 
decision for all eternity. The potential costs of an experiment with 
liberal solicitation rules would well be worth the potential benefits 
of such rules. 
- David A. Rabin 
216 Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private Litigation Under the First Amendment, 1978 
WASH. U.L.Q. 93, 1~ (1978). 
